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GS Paper II

Mains · GS Paper II · 22 questions

Parliament & state legislatures

Every question UPSC has set on this line of the GS Paper II syllabus, newest first — with an approach for each.

Questions per year: 2016: 0, 2017: 3, 2018: 1, 2019: 1, 2020: 2, 2021: 3, 2022: 2, 2023: 2, 2024: 1, 2025: 0, 2026: 2 Asked in 9 of 11 years

UPSC syllabus (verbatim): “Parliament and State legislatures—structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges and issues arising out of these.” Sub-topics in the detailed syllabus →

2026

“Women as a class neither belong to a minority group nor are they regarded as forming a backward class.” In the light of this statement, discuss the evolution of women’s reservation from local bodies to Parliament.

🧭 How to think about this question · directive: “discuss”

Decode the demand

  • Directive 'discuss' with a given lens: the quoted line fixes the angle. First show why women's reservation stands on a footing different from minority and backward-class quotas, then trace its journey from panchayats to Parliament.
  • The issue in one line: women are half the citizenry, cut across every caste and religion, yet are nearly absent from legislatures; reservation answers under-representation, not backwardness.
  • Two things to answer: the constitutional basis (Article 15(3), horizontal reservation, democratic deficit) and the evolution (73rd and 74th Amendments, state experiments, lapsed Bills, the 106th Amendment).
  • The trap: writing a history of the Women's Reservation Bill and ignoring the quotation. Every point in the first half must return to 'neither minority nor backward class'.

Think in a structure

  • Open with the representation gap in one verified number, then one line that answers the quotation directly.
  • First heading: a small table contrasting the three bases (minority, backward class, women), then points on Article 15(3), horizontal reservation and the democratic deficit, each with a case or figure as a sub-point.
  • Second heading: a timeline from 1992 to 2023, then one point per stage with Articles and numbers; note the deferred start honestly.
  • End positively: three concrete steps a policymaker can take, then anchor the conclusion in the Preamble's promise of equality of status and opportunity.
Facts checked at source (5)· open

Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2026, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Guidance: Minimalist IAS, checked 8 Nov 2026 (how we verify). ·

Model answer· 379words · Minimalist IAS

Women are half the citizenry and cut across every caste and religion, yet hold only 75 seats, about 14%, in the 18th Lok Sabha (PIB). Their reservation therefore answers under-representation, not minority or backward-class status.

BasisProvisionTest
MinorityArticles 29–30Religion or language
Backward classArticles 15(4), 16(4)Social and educational backwardness
WomenArticle 15(3)Sex-based disadvantage, under-representation

Why the claim rests on neither ground

  • Separate enabling clause: Article 15(3) lets the State make special provisions for women without any backwardness test.
    • Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar (1995): Article 15(3) permits reservation for women even in public employment.
  • Horizontal, not vertical: women's seats cut across SC, ST and general categories, unlike caste-based vertical quotas.
    • Indra Sawhney (1992) treated women's reservation as horizontal, the model the 106th Amendment follows.
  • Democratic deficit: the remedy fills an absence from decision-making, a question of representation, not of social hierarchy.
    • Only 22 women sat in the First Lok Sabha; 75 sit in the 18th (PIB).

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Evolution from local bodies to Parliament
  2. Way forward

With 1 timeline you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (379 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 8 Nov 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House ?

🧭 How to think about this question · directive: “examine / what”

Decode the demand

  • Two directives: 'examine whether' asks for a tested verdict with evidence on both sides; 'what institutional changes' asks for named, workable reforms. Two headings, both compulsory.
  • The issue in one line: a Speaker chosen by the majority party judges the defection cases that decide whether that majority survives.
  • Three things to answer: why the office is structurally exposed, the evidence that it has actually bent, and reforms that fix incentives rather than blame individuals.
  • The trap: writing a list of recent controversies. The examiner wants the constitutional design flaw, the judicial trail, a fair counterpoint and reforms that carry a committee or court's name.

Think in a structure

  • Open with Articles 93 and the Tenth Schedule's paragraph 6 in one line, then pose the judge-and-player paradox.
  • Vulnerability in dimensions: conflict of interest, delay, judicial correction, vacant deputy, counterpoint; one case or Article per point, drawn as a flowchart of how partisanship enters.
  • Reforms as a table of proposal and proposer, then points that turn each into a concrete step for Parliament; end on the Court's unrealised 2020 call so the close is forward-looking.
Facts checked at source (4)· open
  • Article 93: the House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof”
  • Article 94(c): the Lok Sabha can remove its Speaker through a resolution backed by an absolute majority of its membership.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“may be removed from his office by a resolution of the House of the People passed by a majority of all the then members of the House”
  • Keisham Meghachandra (2020): Parliament may consider replacing the Speaker as arbiter of Tenth Schedule disputes with a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge.Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (21 Jan 2020), [2020] 2 SCR - Supreme Court Reports ↗“Parliament may seriously consider amending the Constitution to substitute the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies as arbiter of disputes concerning disqualification which arise under the Tenth Schedule with a permanent Tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, or some other outside independent mechanism to ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially”
  • The 2nd ARC's 4th Report (Ethics in Governance) recommended that defection disqualifications be decided by the President/Governor on the Election Commission's advice.2nd ARC, Fourth Report: Ethics in Governance (2007) - web.archive.org copy of the DARPG PDF ↗“2.1.3.2.4 Recommendation: a. The issue of disqualification of members on grounds of defection should be decided by the President/Governor on the advice of the Election Commission.”

Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2026, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Guidance: Minimalist IAS, checked 8 Nov 2026 (how we verify). ·

Model answer· 435words · Minimalist IAS

Article 93 asks the Lok Sabha to choose its Speaker and Deputy Speaker 'as soon as may be'; paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) makes that party-elected Speaker the judge of defection petitions. Whether a referee who is also a player can stay neutral is the question.

Has the office become vulnerable to partisan politics?

  • Conflict of interest: the Speaker keeps party membership and is removable by a majority of all members (Article 94(c)), yet decides cases that settle that very majority.
  • Delay as a weapon: paragraph 6 fixes no deadline, so petitions against ruling-side defectors can wait for years while those against the Opposition move fast.
    • Keisham Meghachandra (2020): the Court asked Speakers to decide petitions within three months as the normal rule.
  • Judicial correction as proof: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) made the Speaker a tribunal open to review; Subhash Desai (2023) had to demand decisions in reasonable time. Courts intervene only where neutrality failed.
  • Framers foresaw self-interest: the Constitution already removes the Speaker from the chair when his own position is at stake.
  • Vacant deputy: the Deputy Speaker's post stayed empty through the entire 17th Lok Sabha, removing the customary cross-bench balance.
  • Counterpoint: many Speakers have ruled against their own side and the chair still commands respect; the flaw lies in incentives, not individuals.
Majority elects SpeakerParty membership retainedRemovable by majority (Art 94)Sole judge of defections (Para 6)Delay or haste decides survivalTrust in the chair erodes
  1. Majority elects Speaker
  2. Party membership retained
  3. Removable by majority (Art 94)
  4. Sole judge of defections (Para 6)
  5. Delay or haste decides survival
  6. Trust in the chair erodes

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Institutional changes to ensure neutrality

With 1 table you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (435 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 8 Nov 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

2025

GS Paper II 2025 · Q1

10 marks · 150 words

Discuss the ‘corrupt practices’ for the purpose of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Analyze whether the increase in the assets of the legislators and/or their associates, disproportionate to their known sources of income, would constitute ‘undue influence’ and consequently a corrupt practice.

Approach · directive: “discuss / analyze”

What it asks · Explain what Section 123 of the RPA, 1951 treats as corrupt practices, then analyse whether unexplained growth in the assets of legislators or their associates can be brought within 'undue influence'.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Discuss: the 'corrupt practices' listed in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  2. Analyse: whether a disproportionate rise in the assets of legislators or their associates amounts to 'undue influence' and hence a corrupt practice

Open with · Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 lists corrupt practices; proved in an election petition, one voids the election (Section 100) and can disqualify the candidate (Section 8A).

Cover

  • Corrupt practices: bribery, undue influence, appeals on religion, caste, community or language, promoting enmity, false statements about rivals, excess expenditure, booth capturing.
  • Undue influence (s.123(2)): any direct or indirect interference with the free exercise of an electoral right — threats, social ostracism, spiritual censure.
  • Consequences: election set aside in an election petition (s.100) and disqualification on the ground of corrupt practice (s.8A).
  • For treating it as undue influence: in Lok Prahari (2018) the Supreme Court linked non-disclosure of assets and their sources to undue influence on voters' free choice.
  • Against: s.123 targets acts by a candidate or agent connected with an election; wealth gained in office is primarily an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Middle view: disproportionate assets become a corrupt practice when concealed in the nomination affidavit or used to buy votes (bribery).
  • Way forward: the Law Commission's 244th Report would make a false affidavit a corrupt practice; the Election Commission seeks a two-year minimum under Section 125A.

Close with · Asset growth becomes an electoral wrong when hidden from voters; closing this gap would advance SDG 16.5, to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2025, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 208words · Minimalist IAS

Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 lists 'corrupt practices'. Proved in an election petition, one voids the election (Section 100) and can disqualify the candidate (Section 8A).

Corrupt practices under Section 123

  • Bribery: gratification to induce a person to stand, withdraw or vote.
  • Undue influence (Section 123(2)): interference with the free exercise of an electoral right, such as threats, social ostracism or spiritual censure.
  • Sectarian appeals: votes sought on religion, caste, community or language.
  • Other abuses: false statements about rivals, excess expenditure, booth capturing.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Are disproportionate assets 'undue influence'?
  2. Way forward

With 1 flowchart you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (208 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

GS Paper II 2025 · Q4

10 marks · 150 words

Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Approach · directive: “discuss / describe”

What it asks · Characterise the J&K Assembly under the 2019 Act as a Union Territory legislature (not a State legislature), then outline what it can and cannot do.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Discuss: the nature of the J&K Legislative Assembly after the Reorganisation Act, 2019 — a Union Territory legislature, not a State legislature
  2. Describe briefly: the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of J&K

Open with · The J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories and applied Article 239A, the Puducherry provision, to J&K; the Assembly elected in 2024 is a UT legislature, not a State one.

Cover

  • Nature: a unicameral UT legislature on the Puducherry model; the Lieutenant Governor is the administrator; the Legislative Council was abolished.
  • Composition: 114 seats, of which 24 (areas under Pakistan's occupation) stay vacant; seats reserved for SCs and STs; LG may nominate women, Kashmiri migrants and displaced persons.
  • Law-making: on State List and Concurrent List subjects except 'public order' and 'police'; Parliament's laws prevail in case of conflict.
  • Finance: passes the budget and demands for grants; money bills and bills with financial implications need the LG's recommendation.
  • Executive link: Council of Ministers headed by a Chief Minister, collectively responsible to the Assembly and capped at 10% of its strength.
  • Limits: the LG acts in his discretion on specified matters (police, All India Services, anti-corruption); some bills must be reserved for the President.
  • Debate: restores elected government but with diluted powers; the Supreme Court (Article 370 case, 2023) recorded the assurance of restoring statehood.

Close with · Restoring statehood, as assured before the Supreme Court in the Article 370 case (2023), would complete democratic normalisation.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2025, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 219words · Minimalist IAS

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories, J&K with a legislature and Ladakh without. Its Section 13 applied Article 239A, the Puducherry provision, to J&K, so the Assembly elected in 2024 is a UT legislature, not a State one.

Nature of the Assembly after the 2019 Act

FeatureFormer StateUT of J&K
HousesAssembly and CouncilAssembly only
HeadGovernorLieutenant Governor
Police, public orderState subjectsOutside Assembly's power
  • Unicameral: Section 57 abolished the Legislative Council.
  • Composition: 114 seats; 24 stay vacant for the area under Pakistan's occupation (PoJK), which is Indian territory; SC and ST seats reserved.
  • Subordinate: a five-year term (Section 17); Parliament may still legislate for the UT, and its law prevails.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Powers and functions of the Assembly

Read the full model answer (219 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.

Approach · directive: “examine”

What it asks · Explain the procedure under Article 368 that makes Parliament the amending body, then the substantive limits imposed by the basic structure doctrine, and assess the statement.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Examine: the procedure under Article 368 that vests the amending power in Parliament, with its 'few procedural hurdles'
  2. Examine: the substantive limits — the basic structure doctrine and its application
  3. Assess: whether the statement holds — flexible in procedure, bounded in substance

Open with · Article 368(1) lets Parliament amend 'in exercise of its constituent power', with no constituent assembly or referendum; yet judicial review adds limits that procedure does not.

Cover

  • Initiation only in Parliament; special majority in each House separately; no joint sitting.
  • Federal provisions need ratification by 'not less than one-half of the States'; assent mandatory since the 24th Amendment (1971); some changes by simple majority.
  • Kesavananda Bharati (1973): not even Parliament, through amendment, can violate the basic structure.
  • Applications: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), Minerva Mills (1980), I. R. Coelho (2007), NJAC (2015) — shown as a timeline.
  • Assessment: amended up to the 106th Amendment (2023); Article 13(4) exempts amendments from Article 13, but basic structure remains the real check.
  • Debate: an unelected veto to critics, a shield against majoritarian rewriting to defenders.

Close with · NCERT's description of the Constitution as 'a living' document: Article 368 lets it change, the basic structure keeps its identity.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2025, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 356words · Minimalist IAS

Article 368(1) lets Parliament, 'in exercise of its constituent power', amend 'by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision'. No constituent assembly or referendum is needed, which bears out the statement. Yet judicial review has added limits that procedure alone does not.

Procedural limits under Article 368

  • Initiation: a Bill only in Parliament, in either House, by a Minister or private member; State legislatures cannot initiate.
  • Special majority: a majority of total membership and two-thirds of those present and voting, in each House separately; no joint sitting can break a deadlock.
  • Federal ratification: changes to federal provisions, such as the Seventh Schedule, representation of States, the higher judiciary or Article 368 itself, need ratification by 'not less than one-half of the States'.
  • Assent and exceptions: presidential assent is mandatory since the 24th Amendment (1971); Articles 2–4 and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules change by simple majority.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Substantive limits: the basic structure
  2. Does the statement hold?

With 1 timeline you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (356 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

2024

Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation – one election” principle.

Approach · directive: “examine”

What it asks · Examine why electoral reforms recommended by successive committees are needed, with a focused look at the case for and against simultaneous elections.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Examine: why electoral reforms recommended by various committees are needed
  2. With particular reference to 'one nation – one election': the case for it, the concerns, and what it would require

Open with · Lok Sabha and Assembly elections were held together from 1951 to 1967 until premature dissolutions broke the cycle; committees since have sought to reform how, not just when, India votes.

Cover

  • Committee agenda: Dinesh Goswami (1990) and Indrajit Gupta (1998) on state funding; Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) and the 2nd ARC on cleaner politics.
  • Persistent needs: money power, criminalisation, paid news, opaque party funding, weak inner-party democracy; frequent Model Code of Conduct freezes.
  • Timeline: simultaneous polls 1951–67; Law Commission 170th Report (1999); Standing Committee 79th Report (2015); Kovind committee (2024).
  • Kovind plan: Lok Sabha and Assembly polls together, local bodies within 100 days, single electoral roll; Cabinet accepted it in September 2024.
  • Gains: lower cost, fewer policy pauses, less diversion of security forces and staff, a longer governance horizon.
  • Concerns: national issues may drown State issues; one-time curtailment of Assembly terms; fresh polls only for the unexpired term.
  • Requirements: amendments to Articles 83 and 172, ratification by half the States for the single roll, EVMs and VVPATs, consensus.

Close with · Synchronised polls fix the calendar; only cleaner money and candidates fix the contest. Together they serve SDG 16.7: responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2024, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 223words · Minimalist IAS

Lok Sabha and Assembly elections were held together from 1951 to 1967, until premature dissolutions broke the cycle. Committees since have sought to reform how, not just when, India votes.

Why committees urged reform

  • Money power: the Dinesh Goswami (1990) and Indrajit Gupta (1998) committees backed state funding of elections.
  • Criminalisation: the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) and the 2nd ARC sought cleaner politics; paid news persists.
  • Permanent campaign: frequent polls keep the Model Code of Conduct in force, pausing new projects and diverting security forces.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. The case for 'one nation – one election'
  2. Concerns and requirements
  3. Way forward

With 1 timeline you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (223 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

GS Paper II 2024 · Q3

10 marks · 150 words

“The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.

Approach · directive: “elucidate”

What it asks · Explain how a dominant cabinet has reduced Parliament's effective control over the executive, while noting the checks that still exist.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Elucidate: how the growth of the cabinet system has marginalised Parliament's supremacy — the mechanisms, with evidence
  2. Qualify: the checks that still operate on the cabinet, why Indian Parliament was never fully 'supreme', and the way forward

Open with · Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; in theory the House controls the cabinet, in practice a disciplined majority lets the cabinet control the House.

Cover

  • Agenda control: government business fills the timetable; ordinances under Article 123 legislate while Parliament is in recess.
  • Party discipline: the whip and the anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule) turn a majority into near-automatic approval.
  • Thin scrutiny (PRS, 17th Lok Sabha): 16% of Bills referred to committees, 35% passed with under an hour of debate; 274 sittings, fewest of any full term.
  • Bypass routes: money-bill route skips the Rajya Sabha; delegated legislation leaves law to executive rules.
  • Counterpoint: Question Hour, no-confidence motions, the PAC on CAG reports, coalitions and a Rajya Sabha without a ruling majority still bite.
  • Note: Indian Parliament was never fully 'supreme' — a written Constitution and judicial review bound it from the start.
  • Way forward: NCRWC's minimum of 120 sitting days for the Lok Sabha and 100 for the Rajya Sabha; mandatory committee referral; opposition time.

Close with · Stable cabinets are an asset; a Parliament that sits longer and scrutinises deeper makes collective responsibility under Article 75(3) real.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2024, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 224words · Minimalist IAS

Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. In theory the House controls the cabinet; in practice a disciplined majority lets the cabinet control the House.

How the cabinet has marginalised Parliament

  • Agenda control: government business fills the timetable; ordinances (Article 123) legislate during recess.
  • Party discipline: the whip, backed by disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, turns a majority into automatic approval.
  • Thin scrutiny: in the 17th Lok Sabha only 16% of Bills went to committees, and 35% passed with under an hour of debate (PRS).
  • Fewer sittings: its 274 sittings were the fewest of any full-term Lok Sabha.
  • Bypass routes: the money-bill route sidelines the Rajya Sabha; delegated legislation leaves law to executive rules.
Disciplined majorityCabinet sets agendaBills skip committeesScrutiny weakens
  1. Disciplined majority
  2. Cabinet sets agenda
  3. Bills skip committees
  4. Scrutiny weakens

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. What still checks the cabinet
  2. Way forward

Read the full model answer (224 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

2023

Discuss the role of Presiding Officers of state legislatures in maintaining order and impartiality in conducting legislative work and in facilitating best democratic practices.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Explain how Speakers and Chairmen keep order, act impartially and promote healthy democratic practice in State legislatures, and where they fall short.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Discuss: how presiding officers maintain order in the House
  2. Discuss: how they secure impartiality in conducting legislative work
  3. Discuss: how they facilitate best democratic practices, where they fall short, and the way forward

Open with · Article 178 requires every Legislative Assembly to choose a Speaker, who, though elected on a party ticket, must act as the neutral custodian of the House's rules and every member's rights.

Cover

  • Order: interpreting rules, points of order, admissibility, decorum, suspension; Article 212 bars courts from questioning proceedings for procedural irregularity.
  • Impartiality: casting vote only in a tie (Article 189); removal only by a majority of all the then members (Article 179).
  • Quasi-judicial duties: certifying Money Bills and deciding defection under Tenth Schedule paragraph 6, subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).
  • Democratic practice: Business Advisory Committee, committee referral of Bills, protection of opposition time.
  • Shortcomings: state legislatures met for 22 days on average in 2023 (PRS); partisan defection rulings, mass suspensions, unscrutinised Bills.
  • Way forward: Supreme Court (2020) urged defection rulings within three months and an independent tribunal; minimum sittings and codes of conduct.

Close with · A Speaker's authority rests on being seen as fair; an independent tribunal for defection cases would free the office to serve the whole House.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2023, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 225words · Minimalist IAS

Article 178 requires every Assembly to choose a Speaker who, though elected on a party ticket, must act as neutral custodian of the House's rules and members' rights.

OrderImpartialityQuasi-judicialdutiesDeliberationPresidingofficer

Presiding officer: Order; Impartiality; Quasi-judicial duties; Deliberation

Maintaining order in the House

  • Rules and rulings: interprets rules; decides points of order and admissibility of motions.
  • Decorum: expunges unparliamentary words, suspends disorderly members, adjourns a House that cannot function.
  • Final word on procedure: courts cannot question Assembly proceedings for procedural irregularity (Article 212).

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Impartiality in conducting legislative work
  2. Facilitating best democratic practices
  3. Where they fall short
  4. Way forward

Read the full model answer (225 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Discuss the contribution of civil society groups for women's effective and meaningful participation and representation in state legislatures in India.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Discuss how women's organisations, NGOs and other groups have advanced women's entry into, and influence within, State legislatures, and where they fall short.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Discuss civil society's contribution to women's entry into State legislatures: advocacy, leadership pipeline, candidate and voter support
  2. Discuss its contribution to effective and meaningful participation once elected: capacity building, monitoring and resisting proxy control
  3. Discuss the limits of civil society action and what more is needed

Open with · Women's share of seats is not even 20% in any State Assembly; civil society, from women's movements to election watchdogs, has worked to get women in and make their presence count.

Cover

  • Advocacy: women's organisations kept the reservation demand alive from the 1990s, through the 2010 Rajya Sabha Bill, to Article 332A (106th Amendment, 2023).
  • Leadership pipeline: SHG federations, women's collectives and training of panchayat women after the 73rd Amendment (e.g. The Hunger Project) build future legislators.
  • Candidate and voter support: leadership schools, mentoring and turnout drives make women a constituency parties court.
  • Monitoring: ADR and PRS Legislative Research publish data on candidates and legislative performance, raising the cost of tokenism.
  • Meaningful participation: capacity building, resisting proxy rule and agenda-setting on violence, maternity and workplace safety.
  • Limits and way forward: party gatekeeping, uneven reach and delayed reservation; enforce Article 332A and party commitments, with legislature–civil society orientation.

Close with · Civil society opens the door, but parties and the State must hold it open, as SDG Target 5.5 seeks women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2023, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 363words · Minimalist IAS

Women remain a small minority in State Assemblies: their share of seats is not even 20% in any State, and parties rarely field them in winnable seats. Civil society, from women's movements to election watchdogs, has worked at both ends: getting women in, and making their presence count.

Contribution to women's representation

  • Advocacy for reservation: women's organisations kept the demand alive from the 1990s, through the Bill that passed the Rajya Sabha in 2010 but lapsed, until the 106th Amendment (2023) inserted Article 332A, reserving one-third of Assembly seats for women.
  • Leadership pipeline: self-help group federations, women's collectives and training of elected panchayat women after the 73rd Amendment, as in The Hunger Project's programmes, groom local leaders for higher office.
  • Candidate support: leadership schools, mentoring, campaign training and fundraising help, with pressure on parties to give tickets.
  • Voter mobilisation: registration and turnout drives make women a constituency that parties court; campaigns against two-child norms that disqualify women from local bodies.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Contribution to effective and meaningful participation
  2. Limits of civil society action
  3. Way forward

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Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

GS Paper II 2023 · Q16

15 marks · 250 words

Explain the structure of the Parliamentary Committee system. How far have the financial committees helped in the institutionalisation of Indian Parliament?

Approach · directive: “explain / how far”

What it asks · Explain the types of committees (standing and ad hoc) and then assess how the three financial committees have strengthened Parliament's scrutiny and institutional maturity.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Explain the structure of the parliamentary committee system: standing committees (financial, departmental, others) and ad hoc committees
  2. How far the financial committees have helped institutionalise Parliament: their contribution
  3. Limits of the financial committees and the way forward

Open with · Article 151 sends the CAG's audit reports to each House, which cannot examine them on the floor; committees, cross-party 'mini-Parliaments', give Parliament continuity, expertise and memory.

Cover

  • Standing committees: permanent, such as Business Advisory, Privileges, Rules, Petitions, Ethics and the financial committees, constituted annually or periodically.
  • Departmentally related standing committees: 24 committees (since 1993, in the present form since 2004), each with members from both Houses, to examine demands for grants, Bills, and reports of ministries.
  • Ad hoc committees: Select and Joint Committees on Bills, and committees of inquiry, which cease after their task.
  • Financial committees: the Public Accounts Committee (examines CAG audit reports, chaired by an opposition member by convention), the Estimates Committee (Lok Sabha only) and the Committee on Public Undertakings.
  • Contribution: they check spending after the event, check waste and irregularity, secure ministerial accountability and build bipartisan working habits.
  • Limits: recommendations are not binding, action-taken follow-up is slow, timeliness suffers, and Bills increasingly bypass committees.
  • Reforms: mandatory referral of major Bills, timely reports, expert assistance and stronger follow-up mechanisms.

Close with · The financial committees turned Article 151's audit reports into a working check on the executive; restoring committee referral of Bills would extend that institutional habit to law-making.

Add value (verified)

  • The Public Accounts Committee is Parliament's oldest committee (first constituted in 1921) and has 22 members: 15 elected by the Lok Sabha and 7 associated from the Rajya Sabha.Legislation Committees - Public Accounts Committee - Comptroller and Auditor General of India ↗“The Committee on Public Accounts is the oldest Parliamentary Committee and was first constituted in 1921. The Committee consists of 22 Members, 15 Members are elected by Lok Sabha and 7 Members of the Rajya Sabha are associated with it”
  • PRS found that only 16% of Bills were referred to committees in the 17th Lok Sabha, lower than in the previous three Lok Sabhas.Functioning of the 17th Lok Sabha - PRS Legislative Research ↗“16% of Bills were referred to Committees for detailed scrutiny. This is lower than corresponding figures for the previous three Lok Sabhas.”
  • Article 151(1): the CAG's audit reports on Union accounts go to the President, who has them laid before each House of Parliament, the constitutional basis of the PAC's work.The Constitution of India (Legislative Department) ↗“The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor- General of India relating to the accounts of the Union shall be submitted to the President, who shall cause them to be laid before each House of Parliament.”

Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2023, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 363words · Minimalist IAS

Article 151 requires the CAG's audit reports on Union accounts to be laid before each House of Parliament. The floor cannot examine them, or every Bill, in detail; so Parliament works through cross-party committees, 'mini-Parliaments' that give it continuity, expertise and memory.

Structure of the parliamentary committee system

  • Standing committees: permanent or annual: the three financial committees and the 24 departmentally related standing committees (in present form since 2004), drawn from both Houses, which examine demands for grants, Bills and ministry reports.
  • Other standing committees: Business Advisory, Rules, Privileges and Ethics run the House; Subordinate Legislation and the SC/ST Welfare committee watch the executive.
  • Ad hoc committees: Select and Joint Committees on Bills and inquiry committees, dissolved once their task ends.
Financial committeeMembersCore task
Public Accounts (1921)22: 15 LS, 7 RSCAG audit reports
Estimates30, Lok Sabha onlyEconomies in estimates
Public UndertakingsBoth HousesPSU reports, accounts

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. How far financial committees have institutionalised Parliament
  2. Where the institutionalisation falls short
  3. Way forward

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2022

Discuss the role of the Vice-President of India as the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Explain the Vice-President's constitutional position as ex officio Chairman and how he presides, regulates and represents the House, with concerns about impartiality.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Discuss: the constitutional basis of the Vice-President's position as ex officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
  2. Discuss: the functions — presiding, regulating business, casting vote, committees, discipline and Tenth Schedule decisions
  3. Discuss: the concerns about impartiality, the safeguards, and the conventions that sustain the office

Open with · Article 89(1) makes the Vice-President ex officio Chairman of the Council of States; he presides over a House of which he is not a member (Article 64).

Cover

  • Presiding: maintains order, decides who speaks, and rules on points of order under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business.
  • Regulating business: decides admissibility of notices, motions and questions; refers bills and subjects to committees.
  • Casting vote: does not vote in the first instance, but breaks a tie (Article 100).
  • Committees and discipline: chairs the Business Advisory and Rules Committees; enforces the rules; decides Tenth Schedule petitions, subject to judicial review.
  • Contrast with the Speaker: no Money Bill certificate, which is the Speaker's final call under Article 110(3).
  • Safeguards and concerns: removal needs a Rajya Sabha majority of all members and Lok Sabha agreement (Article 67(b)); he cannot preside meanwhile (Article 92).
  • Way forward: consensus through the Business Advisory Committee and reasoned, timely anti-defection rulings.

Close with · Impartial, firm and consultative chairing keeps the Council of States a deliberative, revising chamber; the office ultimately rests on convention.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2022, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 221words · Minimalist IAS

Article 89(1) makes the Vice-President 'ex officio Chairman of the Council of States'. He presides over a House he is not a member of (Article 64), so his authority rests on neutrality.

Presiding over the Rajya Sabha

  • Order and decorum: decides who speaks and rules on points of order under the House's Rules of Procedure.
  • Regulating business: decides admissibility of notices, motions and questions; refers bills to committees.
  • Casting vote: votes only to break a tie (Article 100).

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Committees and discipline
  2. Safeguards and concerns
  3. Way forward

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GS Paper II 2022 · Q12

15 marks · 250 words

Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor. Discuss the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Two parts: the conditions Article 213 lays down for the Governor's ordinance-making power, and whether repeated re-promulgation of ordinances without placing them before the Legislature is legal.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Discuss: the essential conditions for the Governor's legislative powers, especially the ordinance power under Article 213
  2. Discuss: the legality of re-promulgating ordinances without placing them before the Legislature, with case law

Open with · Article 213 gives the Governor an emergency ordinance power, not a parallel law-making authority; Bihar's 256 ordinances kept alive for up to 14 years show its abuse.

Cover

  • Conditions: the Assembly (or both Houses) is not in session, and the Governor is satisfied, on ministers' advice, that immediate action is needed.
  • Scope: State subjects only; President's instructions where needed (Article 213(1) provisos); an ordinance invalid as a State Act is void (Article 213(3)).
  • Duty: laid before the Legislature; lapses six weeks after reassembly, or earlier if disapproved (Article 213(2)(a)).
  • Other legislative powers: summoning, proroguing and dissolving (Article 174), addressing the House (Article 176), assent to or reservation of bills (Article 200).
  • D. C. Wadhwa (1987): Bihar promulgated 256 ordinances in 1967–81, kept alive for one to 14 years; re-promulgation held a fraud on the Constitution.
  • Krishna Kumar Singh (2017): seven judges held laying mandatory, re-promulgation a fraud on the Constitution, and the Governor's satisfaction open to judicial review.

Close with · D. C. Wadhwa: it is contrary to all democratic norms that the Executive should make law; an ordinance is a bridge to legislation, never a substitute.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2022, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 354words · Minimalist IAS

Article 213 lets the Governor make law by ordinance when the Legislature is not sitting. It is an emergency power, not a parallel legislature. Yet Bihar's Governor promulgated 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981 and kept them alive for one to 14 years.

Essential conditions for the Governor's legislative powers

  • Recess: the Legislative Assembly, or both Houses where there is a Council, must not be in session.
  • Satisfaction: circumstances must need immediate action; the Governor acts on the Council of Ministers' advice, and his satisfaction is open to review for mala fides.
  • Competence: only State subjects; where a bill would need the President's sanction or reservation, his prior instructions are required (provisos to Article 213(1)).
  • Validity: an ordinance that would be invalid as an Act of the State Legislature is void (Article 213(3)); none may infringe fundamental rights.
  • Accountability: it must be laid before the Legislature and lapses six weeks after reassembly, or earlier if disapproved (Article 213(2)(a)).
  • Other powers: summoning, proroguing and dissolving the Assembly (Article 174), addressing it (Article 176), and assent to or reservation of bills (Article 200).
Recess and urgencyOrdinance on Cabinet adviceLaid before the HouseEnacted as law, or lapses six weeks afterreassembly
  1. Recess and urgency
  2. Ordinance on Cabinet advice
  3. Laid before the House
  4. Enacted as law, or lapses six weeks after reassembly

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Legality of re-promulgation without placing ordinances before the Legislature

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2021

To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?

Approach · directive: “to what extent”

What it asks · Assess the tools Parliament has to hold the executive to account and how effective they are today, reaching a reasoned view.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Assess the instruments through which Parliament holds the executive accountable and how far they work in practice
  2. Take a clear position on the extent of accountability, with steps to strengthen it

Open with · Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; Ambedkar said Parliament makes a daily assessment of the executive through questions, resolutions and motions.

Cover

  • Questions and debates: Question Hour, Zero Hour, calling-attention and adjournment motions; the 16th Lok Sabha spent 13% of its time on Question Hour.
  • Financial control: Budget debate, cut motions, and the PAC, Estimates and Public Undertakings Committees; Article 151 lays CAG reports before Parliament.
  • Committees and confidence: Standing Committees scrutinise in depth; a no-confidence motion can remove a government.
  • Weakening scrutiny (PRS): Bills referred to committees fell from 71% (15th Lok Sabha) to 28% (16th); 331 sitting days against a 468 average.
  • Executive dominance: party whips and the Tenth Schedule make defeat rare; disruptions and ordinances thin debate.
  • Way forward: routine committee referral, more sitting days, time-bound replies to assurances and protected opposition time.

Close with · Parliament ensures accountability to a moderate extent; Ambedkar's choice of 'more responsibility to more stability' is honoured only when its daily assessment is real.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2021, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 224words · Minimalist IAS

Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly that members make a 'daily assessment' of the executive through questions, resolutions and motions. How far that holds today is mixed.

How Parliament holds the executive to account

  • Questions and debates: Question Hour, Zero Hour, calling-attention and adjournment motions; the 16th Lok Sabha spent 13% of its time on Question Hour.
  • Financial control: Budget debate, cut motions and the PAC, Estimates and Public Undertakings Committees; Article 151 lays CAG audit reports before each House.
  • Committees: Department-related Standing Committees and those on subordinate legislation and assurances scrutinise in depth, largely beyond party lines.
  • Confidence: a no-confidence motion can remove a government.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Why accountability is only partial
  2. Verdict and way forward

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GS Paper II 2021 · Q14

15 marks · 250 words

Explain the constitutional provisions under which Legislative Councils are established. Review the working and current status of Legislative Councils with suitable illustrations.

Approach · directive: “explain / review”

What it asks · State how Councils are created, abolished and composed (Articles 168 to 172), review their powers and usefulness, and give the present position with examples.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Explain the constitutional provisions under which Legislative Councils are established (Articles 168, 169, 171, 172)
  2. Review the working of Legislative Councils: powers, usefulness and criticism
  3. Give their current status with suitable illustrations

Open with · Article 168 permits a bicameral State legislature, but Article 169 leaves creating or abolishing a Legislative Council to Parliament on the Assembly's special-majority resolution.

Cover

  • Article 169: Parliament creates or abolishes a Council by ordinary law after a special-majority Assembly resolution; such a law is not an Article 368 amendment.
  • Article 171: at most one-third of the Assembly and never fewer than 40; elected by local bodies, MLAs, graduates and teachers, with Governor's nominees.
  • Article 172: a permanent House; one-third of members retire every second year.
  • Powers (Articles 197–198): it can hold an ordinary Bill three months, then one; a Money Bill cannot be introduced there and it may only recommend.
  • Working: a revising chamber and a forum for graduates and teachers, but criticised as costly, delaying and a shelter for defeated politicians.
  • Status (as of 2022): six States have Councils; J&K's ended in 2019; Punjab and West Bengal (1969) and Tamil Nadu (1986) abolished theirs; Andhra Pradesh abolished (1985) and revived (2007).
  • Pending: Rajasthan and Assam proposals await Parliament, and the West Bengal Assembly voted in 2021 to seek a Council; a national policy would end ad hoc cycles.

Close with · Councils add deliberative depth but little power; a consensus national policy under Article 169 would judge them by their revising record, not the ruling party's arithmetic.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2021, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 372words · Minimalist IAS

Article 168 permits a State to have a bicameral legislature, but Article 169 leaves the creation or abolition of a Legislative Council to Parliament, on the initiative of the State Assembly. The Council is thus the one optional chamber in India's federal design.

Constitutional provisions for Legislative Councils

  • Creation and abolition (Article 169): Parliament acts by ordinary law after the Assembly resolves by a majority of its total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting; this is not an Article 368 amendment.
  • Size (Article 171): at most one-third of the Assembly's strength, and in no case fewer than 40 members.
One-third by localbodiesOne-third by MLAsOne-twelfth bygraduatesOne-twelfth byteachersOne-sixth nominatedby GovernorComposition(Article 171)

Composition (Article 171): One-third by local bodies; One-third by MLAs; One-twelfth by graduates; One-twelfth by teachers; One-sixth nominated by Governor

  • Permanence (Article 172): a continuing House; one-third of members retire every second year.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Working of Legislative Councils
  2. Current status and illustrations
  3. Way forward

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Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Do Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committees keep the administration on its toes and inspire reverence for parliamentary control? Evaluate the working of such committees with suitable examples.

Approach · directive: “evaluate”

What it asks · Assess how effective the DRSCs are as instruments of oversight, weighing strengths and weaknesses with examples, and give a reasoned verdict.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Evaluate whether DRSCs keep the administration on its toes: structure, functions and strengths, with examples
  2. Evaluate their weaknesses and whether they inspire reverence for parliamentary control
  3. Give a reasoned verdict and improvements

Open with · Both Houses adopted rules on 29 March 1993 creating 17 DRSCs; they grew to 24 in July 2004 and now carry scrutiny into every ministry.

Cover

  • Structure: 24 committees of 31 members (21 Lok Sabha, 10 Rajya Sabha), one-year terms; a Minister cannot be a member.
  • Functions: Demands for Grants, referred Bills, annual reports and long-term policy, followed up through action-taken reports.
  • Strengths: technical, evidence-based, cross-party scrutiny away from floor partisanship; e.g. the Home Affairs Committee on the 2023 criminal law Bills, later withdrawn and redrafted.
  • Weaknesses: recommendations are not binding, one-year terms break continuity, research support is thin and attendance uneven.
  • Declining referral (PRS): 60% of Bills in the 14th Lok Sabha, 71% in the 15th, 28% in the 16th and 16% in the 17th.
  • Verdict and way forward: effective where Bills and budgets reach them; needs routine referral, longer terms, research staff and time-bound action-taken reports.

Close with · Parliamentary control is revered when it is used: restoring routine referral, as in the 15th Lok Sabha, would let DRSCs keep the administration on its toes.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2021, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 317words · Minimalist IAS

On 29 March 1993 both Houses adopted rules creating 17 Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs); in July 2004 they grew to 24. They carry Parliament's scrutiny from the floor of the House into the detailed working of every ministry.

How DRSCs keep the administration on its toes

  • Full coverage: 24 committees of 31 members each (21 Lok Sabha, 10 Rajya Sabha); a Minister cannot be a member, so the executive cannot judge itself.
  • Budget scrutiny: each considers the Demands for Grants of its ministries, questioning under-spending and scheme design before the vote.
  • Bill scrutiny: officials and experts give evidence that the floor of the House never hears.
  • Illustration: the Home Affairs Committee reported on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill in November 2023, and the Government withdrew it in December and redrafted it (since then).
  • Cross-party consensus: closed-door deliberation softens partisanship, giving reports weight with ministries.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Where reverence for parliamentary control weakens
  2. Verdict
  3. Way forward

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2020

‘Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker’! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India?

Approach · directive: “do you think / implications”

What it asks · Assess whether India should adopt the British convention under which the Speaker leaves party politics and is not opposed at elections, and how it would affect the Lok Sabha's business.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Do you think: whether India should adopt the British 'once a Speaker, always a Speaker' convention to make the office objective — a clear position with reasons
  2. Implications: what it would mean for the robust functioning of parliamentary business

Open with · Article 93 lets the Lok Sabha choose its Speaker, usually from the ruling side and still a party member; in the UK the Speaker leaves the party and is customarily not opposed by the main parties.

Cover

  • Indian context: the Speaker is chosen by the House (Article 93), usually from the ruling side, and contests elections on a party ticket.
  • Stakes: the Speaker's decision is final on Money Bills (Article 110(3)) and on defection disqualification (Tenth Schedule, paragraph 6).
  • Court signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court urged Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for Tenth Schedule disqualification.
  • Precedents: N. Sanjiva Reddy quit his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his party in 2008 for refusing to resign.
  • Implications: neutral rulings, fairer time for the Opposition, fewer disruptions; but multi-party contests mean no convention guarantees an unopposed return.
  • Middle path: resign party membership on election, time-bound disposal of disqualification petitions and an independent tribunal.

Close with · Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but leaving the party, time-bound defection rulings and the tribunal the Supreme Court proposed would give the Chair objectivity.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2020, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 220words · Minimalist IAS

Article 93 lets the Lok Sabha choose its Speaker, usually from the ruling side and still a party member. In the UK the Speaker leaves the party and is customarily not opposed by the main parties, keeping the office above politics.

AspectUK SpeakerLok Sabha Speaker
Party tiesGiven upUsually retained
Next electionMain parties stand asideContests on party ticket

Should India adopt it for objectivity?

  • High stakes: the Speaker's decision is final on whether a Bill is a Money Bill (Article 110(3)) and on defection (Tenth Schedule, paragraph 6).
  • Credibility gap: such rulings are disputed because the Speaker remains a party member.
  • Court signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for defection cases.
  • Indian precedent: N. Sanjiva Reddy left his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his in 2008 for refusing to resign.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Implications for robust parliamentary business

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GS Paper II 2020 · Q14

15 marks · 250 words

Rajya Sabha has been transformed from a ‘useless stepney tyre’ to the most useful supporting organ in past few decades. Highlight the factors as well as the areas in which this transformation could be visible.

Approach · directive: “highlight”

What it asks · Highlight the factors and the areas (legislation, scrutiny, deliberation and federal representation) that show the Rajya Sabha's growing relevance.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Highlight the factors behind the Rajya Sabha's transformation from a 'useless stepney tyre' to a useful supporting organ
  2. Highlight the areas — legislation, scrutiny, deliberation, federal representation — where this is visible
  3. Note the limits that still qualify the transformation

Open with · N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar expected the Second Chamber only to hold dignified debates and delay legislations born of passions of the moment; the Rajya Sabha now does far more.

Cover

  • Factors: coalition arithmetic since 1989, permanence and nominated expertise under Article 80, and exclusive powers under Articles 249, 312 and 67(b).
  • Legislation: it stalled the 2015 Land Acquisition Bill, shaped the GST amendment (2016), and passed the Women's Reservation Bill in 2010.
  • Scrutiny and deliberation: Department-related Standing Committees, Zero Hour and Special Mentions; smaller numbers allow considered debate.
  • Federal voice: State-elected members raise GST compensation, devolution and central laws affecting States.
  • Limits: the money-bill bypass (Aadhaar Act, 2016), disruptions, and the 2003 domicile removal upheld in Kuldip Nayar (2006).
  • Way forward: a clear money-bill test, firm rules against disruption, and a restored domicile link.

Close with · The House now offers the sobriety and second thought Naziruddin Ahmad sought in 1947; its next step is to deepen its role as a House of the States.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2020, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 348words · Minimalist IAS

In the Constituent Assembly (28 July 1947), N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar expected the Second Chamber at most 'to hold dignified debates on important issues and to delay legislations which might be the outcome of passions of the moment'. Seven decades on, the Rajya Sabha does far more than this modest role.

Factors behind the transformation

  • Coalition arithmetic: since 1989 governments have often lacked a majority here, giving Opposition and regional parties real bargaining power.
  • Continuity and expertise: under Article 80 it has up to 238 State and UT representatives and 12 nominated members; one-third retire every two years, so the House never dissolves.
  • Exclusive federal powers: only its two-thirds resolution lets Parliament legislate on a State List subject (Article 249) or create new All-India Services (Article 312).
  • Unique constitutional role: a resolution to remove the Vice-President must pass the Council of States first (Article 67(b)).

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Areas where the transformation is visible
  2. Limits that remain
  3. Way forward

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2019

Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national law maker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Discuss why the individual MP's effective role in making laws has narrowed (party discipline, executive dominance, weak committees, disruptions) and how this has affected the quality of debate and outcomes.

It asks 3 things — answer each

  1. Discuss why the individual MP's role as national law-maker has declined: structural and behavioural causes
  2. Discuss how this has affected the quality of debates and legislative outcomes
  3. Suggest reforms to restore the MP's role

Open with · In the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–24), 35% of Bills were passed with less than an hour of discussion in the House, and 58% within two weeks of introduction (PRS).

Cover

  • Anti-defection: paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule disqualifies members who vote or abstain against the party's direction.
  • Executive dominance: 58% of Bills passed within two weeks of introduction in the 17th Lok Sabha; ordinances and Money Bills cut scrutiny.
  • Committees bypassed: only 16% of Bills referred in the 17th Lok Sabha, lower than the previous three.
  • Private members: only 14 private members' Bills ever enacted, none since 1970.
  • Impact: 274 sittings, the fewest of any full-term Lok Sabha; 35% of Bills passed with under an hour's debate.
  • Outcomes: party messaging replaces clause-by-clause scrutiny; drafting flaws surface later as amendments and litigation.
  • Reforms: default committee referral, research support for MPs, protected private members' time, a whip limited to confidence and money votes.

Close with · The NCRWC's floor of 120 sitting days for the Lok Sabha and 100 for the Rajya Sabha, with default committee scrutiny and a narrower whip, would make the MP a law-maker again, not merely a vote.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2019, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 318words · Minimalist IAS

In the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–24), 35% of Bills were passed with less than an hour of discussion in the House, and 58% within two weeks of introduction (PRS). Such numbers show how far the individual MP has receded as a law-maker.

Why the individual MP's law-making role has declined

  • Anti-defection whip: paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member who votes or abstains against the party's direction, so debate cannot change votes.
  • Executive dominance: ministries draft Bills with little consultation; ordinances and the Money Bill route bypass full scrutiny.
  • Committees bypassed: only 16% of Bills went to committees in the 17th Lok Sabha, lower than in the previous three, removing the forum where MPs work across party lines.
  • Private initiative sidelined: only 14 private members' Bills have ever been enacted, none since 1970.
  • Thin capacity: limited research staff and heavy constituency demands leave MPs unprepared for technical Bills.
Party whip binds votesBills skip committeesDebate time shrinksFlawed laws need later repair
  1. Party whip binds votes
  2. Bills skip committees
  3. Debate time shrinks
  4. Flawed laws need later repair

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Impact on the quality of debates and outcomes
  2. Way forward

Read the full model answer (318 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

2018

GS Paper II 2018 · Q4

10 marks · 150 words

Why do you think the committees are considered to be useful for parliamentary work? Discuss, in this context, the role of the Estimates Committee.

Approach · directive: “why / discuss”

What it asks · Explain why committees help Parliament do detailed, expert and continuous scrutiny, then set out the composition and functions of the Estimates Committee.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Why committees are useful for parliamentary work: detailed, expert, continuous and less partisan scrutiny
  2. Discuss the role of the Estimates Committee: composition, functions and its working

Open with · Woodrow Wilson wrote that Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work; India's Parliament, short of floor time and heavy with business, relies on committees in the same way.

Cover

  • Time and detail: committees save floor time, scrutinise Bills and demands for grants closely, and sit between sessions.
  • Expertise and consensus: closed, less partisan sittings hear ministries, experts and stakeholders.
  • Continuous accountability: financial committees and the DRSCs (rules adopted on 29 March 1993) keep the executive under year-round check.
  • Caveat: since then, PRS data show Bill referrals fell from about 71 per cent (15th Lok Sabha) to about 28 per cent (16th); reports are advisory.
  • Estimates Committee: Rule 310; 30 Lok Sabha members elected yearly by PR-STV; Speaker names the Chairperson; Ministers ineligible.
  • Functions: economies, organisational improvement, efficiency and administrative reform; alternative policies; money well laid out; form of estimates; a sub-committee for Defence estimates.

Close with · Regular referral of Bills and time-bound action-taken replies would make Wilson's insight true of Parliament: in committee it does its real work, and the Estimates Committee guards economy in spending.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2018, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 217words · Minimalist IAS

Woodrow Wilson wrote that 'Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work'. India's Parliament, short of floor time, relies on committees just as much.

Why committees are useful for parliamentary work

  • Time and detail: they save floor time, examine Bills and demands for grants closely, and sit between sessions.
  • Expertise and consensus: closed, less partisan sittings hear ministries, experts and stakeholders.
  • Continuous accountability: financial committees and the Departmentally Related Standing Committees (rules of 29 March 1993) keep the executive under year-round check.
  • Caveat: since then, PRS data show Bill referrals fell from about 71 per cent (15th Lok Sabha) to about 28 per cent (16th); reports bind no one.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Role of the Estimates Committee

With 1 table you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (217 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

2017

“Simultaneous election to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies will limit the amount of time and money spent in electioneering but it will reduce the government’s accountability to the people.” Discuss.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Present the savings in time, money and administrative disruption from holding elections together and set them against the risks to accountability, federal diversity and parliamentary flexibility.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Discuss the gains: time, money and administrative effort saved by simultaneous elections
  2. Discuss the cost: how fixed cycles may weaken the government's accountability to the people, with the federal and constitutional issues, and take a view

Open with · Simultaneous elections were, by and large, the norm until the fourth general election of 1967; early dissolutions then broke the cycle.

Cover

  • Time and money: one poll cuts State and party spending, repeated security and staff deployment, and the Model Code of Conduct's freeze; India now faces five to six elections a year.
  • Accountability: frequent polls are a running referendum; fixed cycles dull it, and strain Article 75(3)'s collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha.
  • Federalism: national issues may swamp regional ones and State choices.
  • Design: constructive no-confidence (Germany's Basic Law, Article 67) keeps a government removable without breaking the cycle.
  • Since 2017: the Kovind committee (March 2024, 18,626 pages) proposed a two-step approach; the Constitution amendment Bill introduced in December 2024 went to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Close with · Simultaneous polls are worth pursuing only if the House can still remove a government that loses its confidence, keeping Article 75(3) intact.

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Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2017, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 229words · Minimalist IAS

Simultaneous elections were 'by and large, in vogue' until the fourth general election of 1967; early dissolutions then broke the cycle. Reviving them trades efficiency against the voter's frequent check.

How it limits time and money spent

  • Lower cost: one poll cuts State and party spending and repeated deployment of forces and officials.
  • Less paralysis: India faces 'five to six elections in a year'; one Model Code of Conduct spell frees governance.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. How it may reduce accountability to the people
  2. Way forward

With 1 table you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (229 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Discuss the role of Public Accounts Committee in establishing accountability of the government to the people.

Approach · directive: “discuss”

What it asks · Explain how the PAC uses CAG audit reports to scrutinise expenditure, what it can and cannot do, and how this makes the executive answerable to Parliament and so to the people.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Discuss how the PAC works: composition, its use of CAG reports and its powers
  2. Discuss how this establishes the government's accountability to the people, with its limits and how to strengthen it

Open with · Article 151 lays the CAG's reports on Union accounts before Parliament; the Public Accounts Committee is where they are examined.

Cover

  • Composition: up to 22 members (up to 15 from Lok Sabha, 7 from Rajya Sabha), constituted every year; an Opposition chair since 1967-68.
  • Mandate: ascertain how money granted by Parliament has been spent; examine CAG audits, e.g. the performance audit of crop insurance schemes.
  • Accountability: secretaries answer to elected members; reports are public; ministries must submit Action Taken Notes on all audit paragraphs.
  • Limits: post-mortem, advisory; a 2009-10 PAC report found 4,934 audit paragraphs pending with ministries.
  • Way forward: time-bound Action Taken Notes, a tracking mechanism, timely tabling of audits and open hearings.

Close with · A PAC whose findings are acted on in time is the surest route to SDG 16.6: effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

Add value (verified)

  • Article 151 requires the CAG's reports on Union accounts to be laid before each House of Parliament, the material on which the PAC's scrutiny is based.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 151 - Legislative Department ↗“The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India relating to the accounts of the Union shall be submitted to the President, who shall cause them to be laid before each House of Parliament.”
  • The PAC is constituted every year; its main duty is to ascertain how the money granted by Parliament has been spent.JPC vs PAC — PRS Legislative Research blog ↗“The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), however, is constituted every year. Its main duty is to ascertain how the money granted (budget) by Parliament has been spent by the government.”
  • Ministries must submit Action Taken Notes on all audit paragraphs; a 2009-10 PAC report found 4,934 paragraphs still pending.JPC vs PAC — PRS Legislative Research blog ↗“ministries have to submit Action Taken Notes to the PAC on all audit paragraphs. A 2009-10 report of the PAC, however, noted that there were 4,934 audit paragraphs still pending with various ministries.”
  • The PAC has examined the CAG's performance audit of agriculture crop insurance schemes.Public Accounts Committee — PRS Legislative Research ↗“Committee on Public Accounts Agriculture and Farmers Welfare Performance Audit of Agriculture Crop Insurance Schemes”
  • SDG target 16.6: develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.Goal 16 targets — UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development ↗“Target 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”

Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2017, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 221words · Minimalist IAS

Article 151 requires the CAG's reports on Union accounts to be laid before Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) turns them into scrutiny, carrying the people's control over the purse to the executive.

Parliament votes grantsMinistries spendCAG auditsPAC examinesAction Taken Notes
  1. Parliament votes grants
  2. Ministries spend
  3. CAG audits
  4. PAC examines
  5. Action Taken Notes

How the PAC works

  • Composition: up to 22 members (up to 15 from Lok Sabha, 7 from Rajya Sabha), constituted every year; an Opposition chair since 1967-68 keeps it non-partisan.
  • Mandate: to ascertain 'how the money granted… by Parliament has been spent', checking for waste, loss and irregularity.
  • Live example: it has examined the CAG's performance audit of crop insurance schemes.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. How it establishes accountability to the people
  2. Limits
  3. Way forward

Read the full model answer (221 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Indian Constitution has provisions for holding joint session of the two Houses of the Parliament. Enumerate the occasions when this would normally happen and also the occasions when it cannot, with reason thereof.

Approach · directive: “enumerate”

What it asks · List when a joint sitting can be held (deadlock on an ordinary Bill under Article 108, and the President's address under Article 87) and when it cannot (Money Bills, constitutional amendments, lapsed Bills), giving the reason in each case.

It asks 2 things — answer each

  1. Enumerate the occasions when a joint sitting would normally happen (Article 108 deadlocks, the President's address under Article 87), with procedure and precedents
  2. Enumerate the occasions when it cannot be held, with the reason in each case

Open with · Parliament is bicameral, so a Bill normally passes each House separately; the Constitution brings the Houses together only for a joint sitting under Article 108 and the President's special address under Article 87.

Cover

  • Article 108 deadlock: a Bill rejected by the other House, final disagreement on amendments, or more than six months without passage.
  • Procedure: President notifies; the Speaker presides (Article 118(4)); a majority of the total members of both Houses present and voting decides.
  • Article 108(5): a notified joint sitting survives a Lok Sabha dissolution; only three held so far (1961, 1978, 2002).
  • Article 87: the President addresses both Houses at the first session after each general election and of each year.
  • Cannot: Money Bills, excluded by Article 108(1), because the Lok Sabha has financial primacy and the Rajya Sabha can only recommend in 14 days.
  • Cannot: Constitution amendment Bills, since Article 368 needs a special majority in each House separately.
  • Cannot: Bills that lapsed on dissolution before notification, or where no deadlock exists.

Close with · Keeping the joint sitting a rare, narrow device preserves the Rajya Sabha as the Council of States: a revising and federal chamber that numbers alone cannot override on money or the Constitution.

Add value (verified)

  • Article 108(1) allows a joint sitting on a disputed Bill but expressly excludes Money Bills.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 108 - Legislative Department ↗“his intention to summon them to meet in a joint sitting for the purpose of deliberating and voting on the Bill: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a Money Bill.”
  • Article 108(4): at a joint sitting a Bill passes by a majority of the total number of members of both Houses present and voting.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“is passed by a majority of the total number of members of both Houses present and voting, it shall be deemed for the purposes of this Constitution to have been passed by both Houses”
  • Article 108(5): a joint sitting may be held, and the Bill passed, even if the Lok Sabha is dissolved after the President notifies his intention.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“A joint sitting may be held under this article and a Bill passed thereat, notwithstanding that a dissolution of the House of the People has intervened since the President notified his intention to summon the Houses to meet therein.”
  • Article 368(2): an amendment Bill must pass in each House by a majority of its total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting”
  • Article 118(4): the Speaker of the Lok Sabha presides at a joint sitting.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“At a joint sitting of the two Houses the Speaker of the House of the People, or in his absence such person as may be determined by rules of procedure made under clause (3), shall preside.”

Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2017, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·

Model answer· 371words · Minimalist IAS

Parliament is bicameral, so a Bill normally passes each House separately. The Constitution brings the two Houses together on two occasions only: a joint sitting under Article 108 to break a deadlock, and the President's special address under Article 87.

Occasions when a joint sitting would normally happen

  • Rejection: a Bill passed by one House is rejected by the other.
  • Disagreement: the Houses have finally disagreed on the amendments to be made.
  • Delay: more than six months pass without the other House passing the Bill.
  • Procedure: the President notifies the intention; the Speaker presides (Article 118(4)). The Bill passes by a majority of the total members of both Houses present and voting, so the larger Lok Sabha usually prevails.
  • Survives dissolution: once notified, the sitting may go ahead even if the Lok Sabha is dissolved meanwhile (Article 108(5)).
  • Precedents: only three so far: the Dowry Prohibition Bill (1961), the Banking Services Commission (Repeal) Bill (1978) and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2002).
  • President's address: under Article 87, both Houses assemble at the first session after each general election and of each year. Ceremonial: no Bill is voted.

The full answer goes on to cover

  1. Occasions when it cannot happen, and why

With 1 table you can reproduce in the exam.

Read the full model answer (371 words) →

Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Syllabus X-Ray of this syllabus line

1 of its 9 sub-topics is Core

1 Core · 3 High · 1 Steady · 4 Rare

  • Core #77Speaker, anti-defection & conduct of business · 6 questions
  • HighRepresentation: women's reservation & simultaneous polls · 5 questions
  • HighLaw-making: ordinances, joint sittings & amendments · 5 questions
  • HighParliamentary committees & financial scrutiny · 4 questions

The X-Ray ranks all 928 sub-topics of the UPSC syllabus by what UPSC has asked since 2016. The 78 Mains Core sub-topics are behind 66% of Mains questions.

See the whole X-Ray →

Quick answers

How many UPSC Mains questions have been asked on Parliament & state legislatures?

22 questions in GS Paper II from 2016 to 2026, asked in 9 of 11 years, most recently in 2026. Each is above, newest first, with the demand, an approach and a model answer.

What does the UPSC syllabus say on Parliament & state legislatures?

The GS Paper II syllabus line reads, in UPSC's words: “Parliament and State legislatures—structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges and issues arising out of these.”

Where are the GS Paper II PYQs topic-wise as a free PDF?

The GS Paper II syllabus-wise PDF — every question since 2016 under its syllabus line, with an approach — is a free download on the Vault's downloads page (one sign-up, no cost).

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