Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House ?
Approach · directive: “examine / what”
What it asks · Assess whether the Speaker's role as adjudicator under the Tenth Schedule has compromised the office's impartiality, and propose reforms for neutrality.
The question has 2 parts — answer each
- Examine whether the Speaker's office has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the Tenth Schedule
- Suggest institutional changes to ensure the Speaker's neutrality in managing a polarised House
Open with · Under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule (added by the 52nd Amendment, 1985), the Speaker decides disqualification petitions for defection — making a party member the judge of party disputes.
Cover
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld the Speaker's role but made decisions subject to judicial review.
- Vulnerability: delayed or selective decisions on disqualification petitions have helped ruling parties, especially in state legislatures.
- Courts have stepped in: Keisham Meghachandra (2020) asked for decisions within three months and suggested an independent tribunal; Subhash Desai (2023) stressed reasonable time.
- Other signs: the Deputy Speaker's post left vacant through the 17th Lok Sabha; disputes over suspensions and allocation of debate time.
- Counterpoint: many Speakers have acted impartially; the problem is structural incentives, not the office itself.
- Reforms: shift defection cases to an independent tribunal or to the President/Governor on Election Commission advice (Dinesh Goswami Committee, 1990).
- Other changes: statutory time limits; filling the Deputy Speaker's post from the Opposition; Speaker giving up party membership and re-election conventions as in the UK.
Close with · A Speaker trusted by both benches is a precondition for a working House; the adjudicatory role needs insulation from party interest.
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2026, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 30 Sept 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer · 221 words (UPSC limit 150) · Minimalist IAS
Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) makes the Speaker the judge of defection petitions: a member of one party deciding disputes that can settle the majority.
Vulnerability under the Tenth Schedule
- Conflict of interest: the Speaker keeps party membership and owes election to the majority, yet rules on cases that decide the government's survival.
- Delay as a weapon: petitions kept pending for months or years, or decided selectively, have favoured ruling parties, especially in state assemblies.
- Courts have had to step in: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) subjected the Speaker's decisions to judicial review; Keisham Meghachandra (2020) sought decisions within three months and mooted an independent tribunal; Subhash Desai (2023) insisted on a reasonable time.
- Counterpoint: many Speakers have acted fairly; the weakness lies in incentives, not in the office.
Institutional changes
- Move defection adjudication to an independent tribunal, or to the President or Governor on the Election Commission's advice (Dinesh Goswami Committee, 1990).
- Statutory time limits for deciding petitions, with reasons recorded.
- Fill the Deputy Speaker's post, vacant through the 17th Lok Sabha, by convention from the Opposition.
- On the British model, the Speaker resigns party membership on election and is returned unopposed.
A Speaker trusted by both benches is the precondition for a working House; insulating the adjudicatory role from party interest is the reform that matters most.
Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.