Parliament & state legislatures

Women are about half the population and cut across every caste, religion and class; their claim to reservation rests on persistent under-representation in elected bodies, not on minority or backwardness status.

Representation, not backwardness

• Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women, independent of Articles 15(4) and 16(4), which serve backward classes.
• The reservation corrects a democratic deficit, the near-absence of half the citizenry from decision-making, rather than social or educational backwardness.

From panchayats to Parliament

• 1992: the 73rd and 74th Amendments reserved at least one-third of seats and chairpersons' posts in panchayats and municipalities (Articles 243D, 243T).
• Many states raised the share to 50 per cent; early 'pradhan pati' proxies have given way to visible leadership by women on water, health and schools.
• Parliament proved harder: bills from 1996 lapsed repeatedly; the 2008 bill cleared the Rajya Sabha in 2010 but lapsed in the Lok Sabha.
• 106th Amendment (2023): one-third of seats in the Lok Sabha, state assemblies and the Delhi assembly (Articles 330A, 332A, 334A) for 15 years, with rotation.
• It operates only after delimitation based on the first census held after the Act; an OBC sub-quota and the rotation design remain contested.

Reservation recognises women as a political constituency in their own right; timely delimitation and capacity-building will decide whether presence becomes power.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) makes the Speaker the judge of defection petitions: a member of one party deciding disputes that can settle the majority.

Vulnerability under the Tenth Schedule

• Conflict of interest: the Speaker keeps party membership and owes election to the majority, yet rules on cases that decide the government's survival.
• Delay as a weapon: petitions kept pending for months or years, or decided selectively, have favoured ruling parties, especially in state assemblies.
• Courts have had to step in: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) subjected the Speaker's decisions to judicial review; Keisham Meghachandra (2020) sought decisions within three months and mooted an independent tribunal; Subhash Desai (2023) insisted on a reasonable time.
• Counterpoint: many Speakers have acted fairly; the weakness lies in incentives, not in the office.

Institutional changes

• Move defection adjudication to an independent tribunal, or to the President or Governor on the Election Commission's advice (Dinesh Goswami Committee, 1990).
• Statutory time limits for deciding petitions, with reasons recorded.
• Fill the Deputy Speaker's post, vacant through the 17th Lok Sabha, by convention from the Opposition.
• On the British model, the Speaker resigns party membership on election and is returned unopposed.

A Speaker trusted by both benches is the precondition for a working House; insulating the adjudicatory role from party interest is the reform that matters most.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 lists the 'corrupt practices' that taint an election: if proved, the election is void (Section 100) and disqualification of up to six years may follow (Section 8A).

Corrupt practices under Section 123

• Bribery: gratification offered to induce a person to stand, withdraw or vote.
• Undue influence (Section 123(2)): direct or indirect interference with the free exercise of an electoral right — threats, social ostracism, spiritual censure.
• Appeals to religion, caste, community or language; promoting enmity; false statements about a rival; excess expenditure; help from government servants; booth capturing.

Are disproportionate assets 'undue influence'?

• For: in Lok Prahari (2018) the Supreme Court held that non-disclosure of assets and their sources, including a spouse's and dependants', misleads voters and is undue influence under Section 123(2).
• Against: Section 123 targets conduct connected with an election; wealth gathered in office is criminal misconduct under the Prevention of Corruption Act, proved in a criminal trial.
• Distinction: asset growth alone is no corrupt practice; it becomes one when concealed in the affidavit or used to buy votes.
• Gap: the Court sought a permanent mechanism to monitor legislators' assets and the Election Commission wants false affidavits made a corrupt practice; neither is legislated.

Disproportionate assets belong first to anti-corruption law and enter electoral law when hidden from voters or used to sway them; Parliament should settle this grey zone by amendment.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories — J&K with a legislature, Ladakh without — and applied Article 239A, the Puducherry provision, to J&K. The Assembly elected in 2024 is therefore a Union Territory legislature.

Nature of the Assembly

• Unicameral: the Legislative Council is abolished; the Lieutenant Governor, not a Governor, is the administrator.
• Composition: 114 seats after delimitation, 24 kept vacant for Pakistan-occupied territory; reservation for SCs and STs; the LG may nominate women, Kashmiri migrants and displaced persons.
• Term of five years, replacing the six-year term under the former State constitution.
• Subordinate: Parliament's power to legislate for the Union Territory is untouched, and a central law prevails in conflict.

Powers and functions

• Legislative: State List subjects except 'public order' and 'police' (entries 1 and 2), and the Concurrent List as applicable to Union Territories.
• Financial: votes the budget and demands for grants; money bills and bills involving expenditure need the LG's prior recommendation.
• Executive control: a Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister, capped at ten per cent of the Assembly's strength, is collectively responsible to the House.
• Limits: the LG acts in his discretion on police, All India Services and anti-corruption matters; specified bills are reserved for the President.

The Assembly restores elected government within a Union Territory frame that keeps security, services and residual power with the Centre; the statehood assured in the Article 370 case (2023) would complete democratic normalisation.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Unlike the United States, where amendments need ratification by three-fourths of the States, India lets Parliament itself amend most of the Constitution under Article 368. The procedure is flexible; the substance is bounded by judicial review.

Procedural limits

• Initiation only in Parliament: a Bill may be introduced in either House, by a Minister or a private member, without the President's prior recommendation; State legislatures cannot initiate.
• Special majority: a majority of the total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting in each House separately; no joint sitting can resolve a deadlock.
• Ratification: changes to federal provisions — election of the President, the Union and State executive and judiciary, legislative relations, the Seventh Schedule, representation of States in Parliament, and Article 368 itself — need ratification by at least half the State legislatures.
• Assent: the President must assent (24th Amendment, 1971); some changes, such as creating new States (Articles 2–4) or altering the Fifth and Sixth Schedules, need only a simple majority and are not deemed amendments.

Substantive limits

• Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Parliament may amend any provision but cannot alter the basic structure — supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, separation of powers, judicial review, federalism, secularism, free and fair elections.
• Applied: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) struck down the 39th Amendment's bar on election challenges; Minerva Mills (1980) held the limited amending power itself part of the basic structure and struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368; I. R. Coelho (2007) opened Ninth Schedule laws added after 24 April 1973 to review; the NJAC amendment fell in 2015.

Assessment

• Procedurally easy: over a hundred amendments since 1950, most passed by Parliament alone, bear out the statement.
• Substantively guarded: the basic structure doctrine is the real check — criticised as unelected judges holding a veto over the amending power, defended as the shield against majoritarian rewriting of the Constitution.

India's amending power is easy to exercise but hard to abuse: procedural flexibility lets the Constitution grow, while the basic structure keeps its identity intact.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Simultaneous Lok Sabha and assembly polls were the norm until 1967; committees from Dinesh Goswami (1990) to the Kovind-led High-Level Committee (2024) have since pressed for electoral reform.

Why reforms are needed

• Money power and opaque funding: Goswami (1990) and Indrajit Gupta (1998) proposed state funding and tighter expenditure control.
• Criminalisation, paid news and weak inner-party democracy, flagged by the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) and the 2nd ARC, remain largely unaddressed.
• A permanent election cycle: repeated Model Code of Conduct freezes and diversion of security forces and staff.

The case for one nation–one election

• Lower cost, fewer policy pauses and a longer governance horizon.
• Backed by the Law Commission (1999), the Parliamentary Standing Committee (2015) and the Kovind committee (2024): Lok Sabha and assembly polls together, local-body polls within 100 days, one electoral roll — accepted by the Cabinet in September 2024.

Concerns and requirements

• Federal balance: national issues may swamp state issues, and assembly terms must be cut or extended once to align cycles.
• Mid-term collapse: fresh elections only for the unexpired term dilute the mandate and may produce short-lived assemblies.
• It needs amendments to Articles 83 and 172, ratification by half the states for some provisions, far more EVMs and VVPATs, and cross-party consensus.

Simultaneous polls can cut cost and policy paralysis, but they are one reform among many the committees urged; federal safeguards and curbs on money and muscle power must go together.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Under Article 75(3) the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; in practice, a cabinet with a disciplined majority controls the very House meant to hold it to account.

How the cabinet has eclipsed Parliament

• Agenda control: government business dominates the timetable, private members' bills rarely progress, and ordinances under Article 123 bypass the legislature.
• Party discipline: the whip, backed by disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, turns a majority into near-automatic approval.
• Thin scrutiny: fewer sittings, bills passed without committee reference, demands for grants guillotined, and the money-bill route that sidelines the Rajya Sabha.
• Delegated legislation: much operative law is made through executive rules with only formal parliamentary oversight.
• Information asymmetry: data and expertise sit with the executive and a centralised Prime Minister's Office, leaving members dependent on the government they must scrutinise.

What still constrains the cabinet

• Question Hour, no-confidence and adjournment motions, and the Public Accounts Committee working on CAG reports still extract answers.
• Coalition governments and a Rajya Sabha without a ruling majority restore bargaining and amendment.
• Parliament was never 'supreme' in the British sense: a written Constitution and judicial review have bound it since 1950.

The remedy is not a weaker cabinet but a more deliberative Parliament — more sittings, mandatory committee scrutiny and protected opposition time — so that stable government coexists with real accountability.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Speaker of a Legislative Assembly and the Chairman of a Council preside over party-based Houses, yet must act as neutral custodians of the rules, dignity and rights of every member.

Maintaining order

• Interpret the rules of procedure, decide points of order and the admissibility of questions, motions and amendments.
• Enforce decorum: expunge unparliamentary words, name and suspend disorderly members, adjourn a House that cannot function.
• Settle the agenda and time through the Business Advisory Committee.

Impartiality

• Conventions: vote only to break a tie (the casting vote), give the opposition fair time, avoid partisan comment; some Speakers resign party membership.
• Quasi-judicial duties: decide disqualification for defection under the Tenth Schedule (paragraph 6) and questions of privilege, where fairness is tested most; the Supreme Court held such decisions open to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).

Facilitating democratic practice

• Refer Bills to committees, admit adjournment and calling-attention discussions and private members' business, certify Money Bills, protect privileges and keep the House meeting regularly.

Shortcomings

• Partisan timing or indefinite delay in defection cases, short sessions, mass suspensions and Bills passed without scrutiny erode trust; the Supreme Court (2020) urged decisions within three months and an independent tribunal for defection cases.

The presiding officer's authority rests on being seen as fair; codes of conduct, time-bound rulings and an independent body for defection cases would strengthen that trust.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Women hold a small minority of seats in State Assemblies, and parties rarely field them in winnable seats. Civil society, from women's movements to research groups, has worked at both ends: getting women in, and making their presence count.

Getting women in

• Advocacy: women's organisations and networks kept the demand for reservation alive from the 1990s, through the Bill that passed the Rajya Sabha in 2010 but lapsed, until the 106th Amendment (2023) inserted Article 332A, reserving one-third of Assembly seats for women.
• Leadership pipeline: self-help group federations, women's collectives and training of elected panchayat women after the 73rd Amendment, such as The Hunger Project's programmes, created a base of local leaders who move up to Assemblies.
• Candidate support: leadership schools, mentoring, campaign training and fundraising help for women aspirants, and pressure on parties to give tickets.
• Voter mobilisation: registration and turnout drives that have narrowed the gender gap in voting, making women a constituency parties court; campaigns against two-child norms that disqualify women from local bodies.

Making participation meaningful

• Capacity building: orientation on rules of procedure, budgets and committee work for first-time women legislators.
• Monitoring: election-watch and legislative research groups such as the Association for Democratic Reforms and PRS Legislative Research publish data on women candidates, criminal records and legislative performance, raising the cost of tokenism.
• Resisting proxy rule: exposing 'sarpanch-pati' style control at the local level and insisting on real decision-making power, a lesson carried into Assemblies.
• Agenda: women's groups feed issues such as domestic violence, maternity and workplace safety into legislative debate and law-making.

Limits

• Money, muscle and party gatekeeping still decide tickets; civil society has uneven reach across States, and its funding and independence are constrained.
• Reservation itself was won by Parliament and awaits delimitation, so civil society's gains remain partial until it takes effect.

Civil society opens the door and prepares women to walk through it; lasting change needs parties to share power and Article 332A to come into force.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Parliament cannot examine every account, Bill or policy on the floor of the House, so it works through committees: small, cross-party bodies that scrutinise in detail, away from cameras and party whips. Their steady growth is the story of Parliament's institutional maturity.

Structure

• Standing committees, constituted every year or permanently: the three financial committees; 24 departmentally related standing committees (since 1993, in present form since 2004), each with members from both Houses, examining demands for grants, Bills and ministry reports.
• Other standing committees: House business (Business Advisory, Rules, Privileges, Petitions, Ethics) and scrutiny bodies such as Subordinate Legislation, Welfare of SCs and STs, and Empowerment of Women.
• Ad hoc committees: Select and Joint Committees on Bills and inquiry committees, dissolved when their task ends.

Financial committees and institutionalisation

• Public Accounts Committee (since 1921; 22 members, 15 from Lok Sabha and 7 from Rajya Sabha) examines the CAG's audit reports; by convention an opposition member chairs it, building a bipartisan habit of scrutiny.
• Estimates Committee (30 Lok Sabha members) suggests economies and policy alternatives in the estimates before money is spent; the Committee on Public Undertakings audits the working of public enterprises.
• Contribution: continuity beyond the life of a House, ministerial accountability through action-taken notes, a check on waste and irregularity, expertise built over years, and a working culture in which government and opposition members judge on evidence, not party lines.

Limits

• Recommendations are advisory; follow-up is slow; scrutiny is after the fact and covers a fraction of spending; members and staff lack technical support; media attention is thin.
• The wider system is weakening: fewer Bills are referred to committees, and sittings have declined, which limits the financial committees' reach.

Reforms

• Mandatory referral of major Bills, time-bound action-taken reports, expert research staff, live publication of proceedings, and a debate in the House on major committee reports.

Financial committees have given Parliament the habits of an institution, continuity, expertise and non-partisan scrutiny, but their promise is capped by advisory status; strengthening follow-up is the surest way to make oversight real.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Vice-President is ex officio Chairman of the Council of States (Article 89), presides over a House of which he is not a member (Article 64), and votes only to break a tie.

Presiding over the House

• Maintains order and decorum, decides who speaks and for how long, and rules on points of order under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business.
• Regulates business: decides the admissibility of notices, motions and questions, and refers bills and subjects to committees.
• Casting vote: does not vote in the first instance, but has a casting vote when the House is equally divided (Article 100).

Committees and discipline

• Chairs the Business Advisory, Rules and General Purposes Committees and constitutes the Department-related Standing Committees.
• Directs disorderly members to withdraw, may suspend them under the rules, and decides disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, subject to judicial review.

Continuity and concerns

• The elected Deputy Chairman presides in his absence; when the Vice-President acts as President he does not perform the Chairman's duties (Article 64).
• Removal only by a resolution of the Rajya Sabha (Article 67(b)) protects the office, yet recurring disputes over suspensions, divisions and anti-defection decisions test its neutrality.

The office runs on convention: impartial, firm and consultative chairing keeps the Rajya Sabha a deliberative and revising chamber rather than an arena.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Governor is part of the State Legislature (Article 168) and holds legislative powers: summoning, proroguing and dissolving the Assembly (Article 174), addressing it (Article 176), assent to or reservation of bills (Article 200), and promulgating ordinances (Article 213). The last is an emergency power, not a parallel source of law.

Essential conditions for ordinances (Article 213)

• Timing: the Legislative Assembly, or both Houses where there is a Council, must not be in session.
• Satisfaction: the Governor must be satisfied that circumstances require immediate action; he acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and the satisfaction is open to judicial review for mala fides.
• Subject: only matters within the State Legislature's competence; where a bill on the subject would need the President's prior sanction or reservation, the Governor needs the President's instructions (provisos to Article 213(1)).
• Limits: an ordinance can do no more than an Act of the Legislature could, and none may infringe fundamental rights.
• Duty: it must be laid before the Legislature and ceases to operate six weeks after reassembly, or earlier if disapproved by resolution (Article 213(2)(a)); the Governor may withdraw it at any time.

Legality of re-promulgation

• D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987): Bihar had kept ordinances alive for years by re-promulgating them without legislative approval; the Supreme Court held this a fraud on the Constitution and a subversion of the democratic process.
• Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017): a seven-judge Bench held that laying an ordinance before the Legislature is mandatory, that re-promulgation is a fraud on the Constitution, and that the Governor's satisfaction is not immune from judicial review.
• Effect: an ordinance is a temporary measure, so rights and liabilities created under it do not ordinarily survive its lapse.
• Principle: the power exists for genuine urgency; using it to bypass the House, or repeating it after the House has met without approval, is unconstitutional, and only the Legislature can give an ordinance permanent life by enacting it.

Ordinance-making is an exception to legislative supremacy, not an alternative to it; re-promulgation without placing the ordinance before the House negates parliamentary democracy and does not survive judicial scrutiny.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; how far this holds depends on how well Parliament's instruments of accountability work in practice.

Instruments that work

• Questions and debates: Question Hour, Zero Hour, calling-attention notices, adjournment motions and the debate on the President's Address force ministers to answer and expose lapses.
• Financial control: Budget discussion, cut motions and appropriation, backed by the Public Accounts, Estimates and Public Undertakings Committees working on CAG reports.
• Committees: Department-related Standing Committees, and committees on subordinate legislation and government assurances, allow detailed, largely non-partisan scrutiny.
• Confidence: a no-confidence motion or defeat on a money Bill can bring a government down.

Why accountability is partial

• Party whips and the Tenth Schedule make the defeat of a government rare, so accountability works through exposure rather than removal.
• Disruptions, fewer sitting days, Bills passed without debate, heavy use of ordinances and declining referral of Bills to committees weaken scrutiny.

Extent and way forward

• Verdict: Parliament ensures accountability to a moderate extent, strong on paper but uneven in use.
• Fixes: more sitting days, routine committee referral, time-bound replies to assurances, protected opposition time and closer review of delegated legislation.

Parliament's instruments are adequate; what is missing is their regular use. Restoring debate, committee scrutiny and cross-party norms would make executive accountability real rather than formal.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Article 168 allows a State to have a Legislative Council as a second chamber; under Article 169 the decision to create or abolish one rests with Parliament, on the initiative of the State Assembly.

Constitutional provisions

• Article 169: Parliament creates or abolishes a Council by ordinary law after the Assembly resolves by a majority of its total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting; such a law is not an Article 368 amendment.
• Article 171: strength is at most one-third of the Assembly and at least 40; one-third each elected by MLAs and by local bodies, one-twelfth each by graduates and by teachers, and one-sixth nominated by the Governor.
• Article 172: a permanent House, with one-third of members retiring every second year.
• Powers (Articles 197-198): it can delay an ordinary Bill by three months, then one month; on Money Bills it may only recommend within 14 days.

Working

• Merits: revises hasty legislation, gives experts, graduates and teachers a forum, and lets governments draw talent from outside the Assembly.
• Criticism: costly for weak powers, slow, and a shelter for defeated politicians and patronage; since the Assembly can override it, it is at best a delaying chamber.

Current status and illustrations

• Six States have Councils (as of 2022): Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Telangana and Uttar Pradesh; Jammu and Kashmir's ended with the Reorganisation Act, 2019.
• Abolitions: Punjab and West Bengal (1969) and Tamil Nadu (1986); Andhra Pradesh abolished its Council in 1985 and revived it in 2007.
• Pending: the Rajasthan and Assam proposals await Parliament, and the West Bengal Assembly voted in 2021 to seek a Council.

Councils add deliberative depth but little power; whether they justify their cost is a political choice, and Article 169 ensures that Parliament, not the ruling party of the day, makes it.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Set up in 1993 and expanded to 24 in 2004, the Department-related Standing Committees (DRSCs) extend Parliament's scrutiny to the detailed working of every ministry through closed, largely non-partisan deliberation.

Structure and functions

• 24 committees cover all ministries; each has 31 members (21 from the Lok Sabha, 10 from the Rajya Sabha) for a term of up to a year, and Ministers cannot be members.
• They examine Demands for Grants, Bills referred to them, annual reports and long-term policy papers, and follow up through action-taken reports.

Keeping administration on its toes

• Depth: technical scrutiny with evidence from officials and experts that the floor of the House cannot provide.
• Consensus: reports are usually cross-party, which gives them weight with ministries.
• Examples: the Standing Committee on Finance's examination of the Direct Taxes Code Bill reshaped its provisions; the Standing Committee on Home Affairs examined the three criminal law Bills of 2023, after which the Government withdrew and redrafted them.
• Financial oversight: scrutiny of Demands for Grants questions under-spending and scheme design before Parliament votes.

Where reverence is weak

• Recommendations are not binding and are often ignored; action-taken reports come late.
• Referral is shrinking: only 16 per cent of Bills in the 17th Lok Sabha went to committees, lower than in the previous three Lok Sabhas.
• Uneven attendance, one-year terms that break continuity, thin research support and closed proceedings that limit public pressure.

Verdict and way forward

• DRSCs keep the administration on its toes where Bills and budgets reach them, but reverence for parliamentary control grows only with routine referral, published evidence, time-bound action-taken reports and expert staff.

DRSCs are Parliament's most effective working tools of oversight; they inspire respect for parliamentary control only when Parliament itself uses them and acts on what they say.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

In the UK the Speaker leaves the party on election, is customarily unopposed by the main parties at the next poll and is re-elected to the chair, so the office stands above politics; India has debated but not adopted this.

Case for adopting it

• Credibility: money-bill certification, admission of motions, suspensions and Tenth Schedule disqualifications are contested because the Speaker remains a party member.
• Judicial signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for defection cases instead of the Speaker.
• Precedent: N. Sanjiva Reddy left his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his in 2008 for refusing to resign.

Why full adoption is hard

• The Speaker is elected by the House (Article 93), usually from the ruling side, and fights elections on a party ticket; in multi-party contests no convention guarantees an unopposed return.

Implications for parliamentary business

• Positive: neutral rulings, fairer time for the Opposition, fewer disruptions, faster decisions on disqualification petitions.
• Risks: without an all-party bargain the office could weaken, and a Speaker cut off from the majority may struggle to carry the House.

Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but its spirit can be adopted now: leaving the party, time-bound disposal of disqualification petitions and an independent tribunal for defections would give the office the objectivity the British model achieves by custom.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Conceived as a House of the States and a revising chamber, the Rajya Sabha was long dismissed as a spare wheel; since the coalition era it has become a real check on hasty legislation and a forum for deliberation.

Factors behind the transformation

• Design: a permanent House of up to 250 members (238 elected by State and UT legislatures, 12 nominated), one-third retiring every two years, gives continuity the Lok Sabha lacks.
• Numbers: since 1989 governments have often lacked a majority here, so Opposition and regional parties gained real bargaining power.
• Federal powers: Article 249 (legislating on a State List subject in the national interest) and Article 312 (creating All-India Services) need a two-thirds resolution of the Council of States alone.
• Expertise: nominated members under Article 80 bring scholars, artists and professionals into debate.

Areas where it is visible

• Legislation: it revised or stalled contentious Bills, as with the 2015 Land Acquisition Bill; constitutional amendments need its support, as the GST amendment (2016) showed; it passed the Women's Reservation Bill in 2010 when the Lok Sabha did not (since then enacted in 2023).
• Scrutiny: through Department-related Standing Committees, Zero Hour and Special Mentions, members probe Bills, budgets and administration beyond the executive's hold over the Lok Sabha.
• Deliberation: longer tenures and smaller numbers allow more considered debate and cross-party consensus.
• Federal voice: State concerns on GST compensation, devolution and central laws find expression through State-elected members.

Limits

• Disruptions and low productivity; the money-bill route (Aadhaar Act, 2016) sidesteps it; and the 2003 removal of the domicile requirement, upheld in Kuldip Nayar (2006), weakened its link with the States it represents.

The Rajya Sabha has grown from a stepney into a supporting wheel through its federal design, special powers and coalition-era arithmetic; restoring its State link and its decorum would complete the transformation.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

In a parliamentary system the executive drafts laws and the House passes them on party lines, but the individual MP is meant to scrutinise, amend and debate; in India that space has narrowed.

Why the MP's role has declined

• Anti-defection law: paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member who votes or abstains against the party's direction, so persuasion in debate cannot change a vote.
• Executive dominance: bills come from ministries with little consultation and are pushed through in hours; ordinances and the Money Bill route bypass scrutiny in the Rajya Sabha.
• Weak committee stage: PRS data show only about 16 per cent of bills were referred to committees in the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–24), lower than in the previous three Lok Sabhas, so MPs lose the one forum where they work across party lines.
• Private initiative: only 14 private members' bills have ever been enacted, none since 1970; most lapse without discussion.
• Capacity: limited research support, uneven attendance and the pull of constituency work leave MPs unprepared for technical legislation.

Impact on debate and outcomes

• Fewer sitting days and frequent disruptions shrink debate time, and bills are sometimes passed amid din.
• Debates become party messaging rather than clause-by-clause scrutiny, so drafting errors and unintended effects surface only after enactment.
• Laws passed without committee review invite amendment and litigation later, weakening the quality and legitimacy of outcomes.

Reforms

• Refer bills to committees by default, guarantee a minimum number of sittings, give MPs professional research staff, protect time for private members' business, and limit the whip to confidence and money votes.

The MP's decline as law-maker is structural, not personal; stronger committees, guaranteed debate time and a narrower whip would restore the individual member's voice and, with it, the quality of law.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Parliament's time is short and its business vast, so committees act as miniature Houses that examine Bills, budgets and administration in depth.

Why committees are useful

• Time and detail: they save floor time, examine Bills and demands for grants clause by clause, and work between sessions.
• Expertise and consensus: they hear ministries, experts and stakeholders in closed, less partisan sittings where members build cross-party agreement.
• Continuous accountability: the financial committees (Public Accounts, Estimates, Public Undertakings) and the Departmentally Related Standing Committees keep the executive under year-round check.
• Caveat: Bill referrals fell from about 71 per cent in the 15th Lok Sabha to about 25 per cent in the 16th (PRS data), and reports bind no one.

The Estimates Committee

• Composition: 30 Lok Sabha members elected yearly by proportional representation through the single transferable vote; the Speaker appoints the Chairperson; Ministers are ineligible.
• Functions: to report what economies, improvements in organisation, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent with the policy underlying the estimates, may be effected; to suggest alternative policies for efficiency and economy; to examine whether money is well laid out; and to suggest the form of the estimates.
• Working: called the continuous economy committee, it examines selected expenditure subjects through the year; its advice is not binding and depends on action-taken follow-up.

Committees give Parliament depth and continuity in oversight; the Estimates Committee's economy-focused review of spending stays valuable if its advice is acted upon.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

India held Lok Sabha and Assembly polls together in its first four general elections; the cycle broke after 1967 as Houses were dissolved early.

Time and money saved

• One poll cuts spending by the State and by parties, and spares repeated deployment of security forces, teachers and officials.
• A single spell of the Model Code of Conduct means fewer months in which decisions and schemes stall.

The accountability cost

• Frequent elections work as a standing referendum; with fixed terms, a government that has lost support becomes harder to remove or punish at the ballot.
• National issues and parties may swamp regional ones, and voters may choose the same party at both levels, weakening the federal distinctness of State polls.

What a workable design needs

• Amending Articles 83, 85, 172, 174 and 356 to fix terms and handle early dissolution, with devices such as a constructive no-confidence vote or a fresh election for the remainder term only, plus party consensus and enough EVMs and paper-trail units.
• Since then, the Kovind committee (March 2024) proposed a 2029 start, and the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024 went to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Savings are real, but must not come at the cost of the House's hold on the executive; keeping no-confidence and federal choice intact is the test.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Public Accounts Committee examines whether money voted by Parliament was spent as authorised. Article 151 places the CAG's reports before both Houses, and the PAC is the forum that follows them up.

How the PAC works

• Composition: 22 members (15 Lok Sabha, 7 Rajya Sabha); since 1967-68 the chair has gone by convention to the Opposition, which keeps its scrutiny non-partisan.
• Scrutiny: it studies appropriation accounts and audit reports for loss, waste, extravagance and irregular spending, and summons secretaries to explain.
• Follow-up: its recommendations go to the House, and ministries must file Action Taken Reports on each.

How this makes government accountable

• Officials answer to elected members in the people's name, not only to their own ministers.
• Findings and evidence become public documents that the press, civil society and voters can use.
• Sustained examination deters careless spending and fixes responsibility for decisions.

Limits

• It examines expenditure after the money is gone, so it corrects rather than prevents.
• Recommendations are advisory; late audit reports, delayed replies and weak monitoring dilute them.

Strengthening

• Time-bound tabling of audit reports and government replies, a standing mechanism to track action taken, and open proceedings.

The PAC converts audit findings into parliamentary and public scrutiny; its authority is moral rather than coercive, and it bites only when the government acts on what it finds.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Constitution brings both Houses together in two ways: a joint sitting under Article 108 to break a deadlock on a Bill, and the President's address to both Houses under Article 87.

When a joint sitting is held

• Deadlock under Article 108: after a Bill passed by one House is rejected by the other, or the Houses finally disagree on amendments, or the other House lets more than six months pass without passing it, the President may notify an intention to summon a joint sitting.
• Procedure: the Speaker presides (Article 118(4)); the Bill passes by a majority of the members of both Houses present and voting, so the Lok Sabha's larger strength usually prevails.
• Precedents: only three so far, on the Dowry Prohibition Bill (1961), the Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill (1978) and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2002).
• President's address: under Article 87 the President addresses both Houses assembled together after each general election and at the first session of every year; this is a ceremonial gathering, not a vote on a Bill.

When it cannot be held, and why

• Money Bills: Article 108(1) expressly excludes them. The Rajya Sabha can only recommend changes within 14 days and the Lok Sabha's decision is final, so no deadlock can arise; financial primacy rests with the directly elected House.
• Constitution amendment Bills: Article 368 requires a special majority in each House separately; a joint sitting would let the larger House override the Rajya Sabha and erode the rigidity of the amending process and the States' voice in it.
• Lapsed Bills: a Bill pending in the Lok Sabha lapses on its dissolution, and no joint sitting can be called for it unless the President had already notified the intention to summon one (Article 108(1) and (5)).
• No deadlock: where the Houses have not disagreed in one of the three prescribed ways, the condition for Article 108 is simply absent.

The joint sitting is a narrow device for ordinary and financial Bills; Money Bills and constitutional amendments are kept out so that the Lok Sabha's financial supremacy and the rigour of the amending process stay intact.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.