Federalism & devolution

Women are about half the population and cut across every caste, religion and class; their claim to reservation rests on persistent under-representation in elected bodies, not on minority or backwardness status.

Representation, not backwardness

• Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women, independent of Articles 15(4) and 16(4), which serve backward classes.
• The reservation corrects a democratic deficit, the near-absence of half the citizenry from decision-making, rather than social or educational backwardness.

From panchayats to Parliament

• 1992: the 73rd and 74th Amendments reserved at least one-third of seats and chairpersons' posts in panchayats and municipalities (Articles 243D, 243T).
• Many states raised the share to 50 per cent; early 'pradhan pati' proxies have given way to visible leadership by women on water, health and schools.
• Parliament proved harder: bills from 1996 lapsed repeatedly; the 2008 bill cleared the Rajya Sabha in 2010 but lapsed in the Lok Sabha.
• 106th Amendment (2023): one-third of seats in the Lok Sabha, state assemblies and the Delhi assembly (Articles 330A, 332A, 334A) for 15 years, with rotation.
• It operates only after delimitation based on the first census held after the Act; an OBC sub-quota and the rotation design remain contested.

Reservation recognises women as a political constituency in their own right; timely delimitation and capacity-building will decide whether presence becomes power.

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The Governor is the constitutional head of the State (Article 153), appointed by the President and holding office during his pleasure (Articles 155–156): at once the State's formal executive and the Union's link with it.

Position in the federal polity

• Dual role: the Governor acts on the advice of the State's Council of Ministers, yet is a Union appointee expected to keep the President informed about the State.
• This duality makes the office a flashpoint in opposition-ruled states: delayed bills, disputes over summoning the House and government formation, and Article 356 reports.
• The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions therefore urged eminent, non-partisan appointees and time-bound decisions on bills.

Nature of the assent power (Article 200)

• Options: grant assent; withhold assent and return the bill (except a Money Bill) with a message for reconsideration; or reserve it for the President.
• A bill passed again must receive assent, and the article expects a decision 'as soon as possible': the power is a constitutional duty to decide, not a pocket veto.
• State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (April 2025): the Court laid down timelines and treated long-pending bills as deemed assented.
• Presidential Reference opinion (November 2025): courts cannot fix timelines or deem assent, but prolonged, unexplained inaction remains open to limited judicial review.
• The assent power is thus formal, exercised on ministerial advice in the ordinary course; reservation for the President is its narrow discretionary element.

Bound by aid and advice?

• Rule: Article 163 binds the Governor except where the Constitution requires discretion; Shamsher Singh (1974) confirmed ministerial primacy and Nabam Rebia (2016) read discretion narrowly.
• Exceptions: reserving bills, choosing a Chief Minister in a hung House, recommending President's rule under Article 356, Sixth Schedule functions and Article 371 duties.
• Even these are constitutional, not personal: discretion must be exercised in good faith, for the purpose the Constitution intends, and is not beyond judicial review.

The Governor must be a constitutional bridge, not a partisan agent: conventions of restraint, prompt decisions on bills and neutral appointments are what protect cooperative federalism.

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Indian federalism is a 'holding-together' design: a strong Centre with flexible units, built to keep a multilingual, multi-ethnic country united by accommodating identity rather than suppressing it.

Extent of success

• Linguistic reorganisation from 1956 turned language from a threat into a basis of statehood; Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand (2000) and Telangana (2014) answered regional demands.
• Articles 29–30 and the Eighth Schedule (22 languages) protect cultural and linguistic identity; accords such as Mizoram (1986) converted insurgency into constitutional politics.
• Strains persist: ethnic conflict in Manipur, language controversies, fiscal centralisation through cesses outside the divisible pool, and Governor–state friction.
• Verdict: the framework has largely succeeded, but accommodation is uneven and depends heavily on the Centre's goodwill.

Role of asymmetric federalism

• Instruments: Sixth Schedule autonomous councils, special provisions under Articles 371 to 371J, Fifth Schedule areas and differentiated Union Territory arrangements.
• Asymmetry protects land, customary law, culture and local institutions in the North-East and tribal areas, and eased insurgencies by offering self-rule within the Union.
• It also invites demands for parity and can freeze arrangements that need review; asymmetry must therefore be a living, negotiated instrument.

Making dispute resolution effective

• Inter-State Council (Article 263): regular meetings, a permanent secretariat and standing committees to mediate before disputes reach litigation.
• Water: a standing inter-state water tribunal with benches, data-based river basin authorities and time limits, in place of tribunals that take decades.
• Fiscal: a GST Council dispute-settlement mechanism, which Article 279A(11) itself contemplates.
• Zonal Councils with agendas and follow-up; time-bound Central mediation; sparing use of Article 131 suits.

Indian federalism has held diversity together well; institutionalised dialogue and faster, rule-based dispute resolution will keep diversity a strength rather than a fault line.

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The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories — J&K with a legislature, Ladakh without — and applied Article 239A, the Puducherry provision, to J&K. The Assembly elected in 2024 is therefore a Union Territory legislature.

Nature of the Assembly

• Unicameral: the Legislative Council is abolished; the Lieutenant Governor, not a Governor, is the administrator.
• Composition: 114 seats after delimitation, 24 kept vacant for Pakistan-occupied territory; reservation for SCs and STs; the LG may nominate women, Kashmiri migrants and displaced persons.
• Term of five years, replacing the six-year term under the former State constitution.
• Subordinate: Parliament's power to legislate for the Union Territory is untouched, and a central law prevails in conflict.

Powers and functions

• Legislative: State List subjects except 'public order' and 'police' (entries 1 and 2), and the Concurrent List as applicable to Union Territories.
• Financial: votes the budget and demands for grants; money bills and bills involving expenditure need the LG's prior recommendation.
• Executive control: a Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister, capped at ten per cent of the Assembly's strength, is collectively responsible to the House.
• Limits: the LG acts in his discretion on police, All India Services and anti-corruption matters; specified bills are reserved for the President.

The Assembly restores elected government within a Union Territory frame that keeps security, services and residual power with the Centre; the statehood assured in the Article 370 case (2023) would complete democratic normalisation.

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NITI Aayog's Fiscal Health Index, first released in January 2025, ranks 18 major States on a composite of five sub-indices, turning scattered fiscal data into one comparable scorecard.

FHI as a tool for assessing State finances

• Design: five sub-indices — quality of expenditure, revenue mobilisation, fiscal prudence, debt index and debt sustainability — capture both annual flows and the stock of accumulated debt.
• Diagnosis, not just a score: each sub-index shows a State's weak spot — high committed spending on salaries, pensions and interest, low own-tax effort, or debt growing faster than revenue — so reform can be targeted.
• Benchmarking: the 2025 edition ranked Odisha first (67.8), followed by Chhattisgarh and Goa; a second edition followed in 2026, allowing States to be tracked over time.
• Comparability: a common yardstick lets the Union, the Finance Commission, lenders and citizens read State finances the same way.

How it encourages prudent, sustainable policy

• Peer pressure: public rankings create competitive federalism and a reputational stake; rating agencies and bond markets read the signal, which can affect borrowing costs.
• Policy leverage: it can inform Finance Commission and Union decisions on performance-linked grants and additional borrowing space tied to reforms.
• Nudges the right choices: capital expenditure over populist transfers, better tax and non-tax collection, and disclosure of off-budget borrowings and contingent liabilities such as guarantees.
• Limits: data lags, uniform weights across very different States, special-category constraints and dependence on Union transfers; it must not become a stick to squeeze welfare or an excuse for pro-cyclical cuts.

Used as a mirror rather than a stick, the FHI can institutionalise fiscal responsibility at the level of government that spends most of India's public money — and make sustainable finances a matter of State pride.

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India's fiscal constitution gives the Centre the more buoyant taxes and the States the larger spending responsibilities, so transfers sit at the heart of its federalism. The planning era shaped those transfers; recent reforms have reshaped them.

The planning-era pattern

• Two channels: the Finance Commission (Article 280) recommended statutory tax devolution and grants, while the Planning Commission — an executive body — allocated plan assistance, from 1969 by the Gadgil formula.
• Discretion grew: Article 282 grants and a multiplying set of centrally sponsored schemes tied State budgets to central priorities and conditions.
• Dependence: States relied on plan loans and grants, and the 'plan' and 'non-plan' split distorted spending priorities.

Recent reforms

• Institutional: NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission in 2015, ending plan grants; transfers now flow through the Finance Commission or schemes.
• Devolution: the 14th Finance Commission raised the States' share of the divisible pool to 42%; the 15th kept it at 41% after J&K's reorganisation.
• GST (101st Amendment, 2016): the GST Council pooled Union and State sovereignty over indirect taxes; States gave up VAT and entry taxes; the guaranteed compensation ended in 2022.
• Support: 50-year interest-free capital-expenditure loans to States, performance-linked grants, and rationalisation of schemes.

How far fiscal federalism has changed

• Gains: higher untied devolution, cooperative decision-making in the GST Council, and more transparency in transfers.
• Losses: cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool have grown, shrinking what 41% applies to; Union control over State borrowing, including off-budget debt, provoked Kerala's suit in the Supreme Court; the GST Council's consensus culture has frayed and States have lost tax autonomy.
• Net: cooperative in form, centralising in substance.

Way forward

• Cap or share cesses, build a predictable compensation logic for revenue shocks, make the GST Council's dispute mechanism work, and let the Sixteenth Finance Commission's award set rule-bound, formula-based transfers.

Recent reforms have deepened fiscal cooperation and centralisation at once; rule-bound, trust-based transfers — not discretion — are the test of genuine fiscal federalism.

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The principle of subsidiarity holds that decisions should be taken at the lowest level competent to take them — closest to the information and to the people who execute. The statement claims that contemporary development models violate it.

Where the claim holds

• Uniform design: schemes framed in Delhi or State capitals with standard norms ignore local soils, water, cropping patterns and social realities — the same toilet, tank or crop package everywhere.
• Unfinished devolution: local bodies lack funds, functions and functionaries; most of the 29 subjects of the Eleventh Schedule and 18 of the Twelfth remain undevolved despite Article 243G's promise of self-government.
• Bypassing: parallel bodies — SPVs, line departments, district committees — take decisions that elected panchayats and municipalities should take, cutting the feedback loop between execution and design.
• Outcomes: poor local ownership, unused assets, leakages and weak results despite high spending — information about what fails reaches decision-makers late, if at all.

Where the claim overstates

• Scale matters: macro policy, standards, digital public infrastructure and inter-regional equity need central decisions; a district cannot run a payments system or set drug standards.
• Local capture: decentralised decisions can be captured by local elites and caste hierarchies; central norms protect the weak.
• Proximity is returning: the Aspirational Districts Programme uses district-level data and district-led problem-solving; Gram Panchayat Development Plans; direct Finance Commission grants to local bodies; social audits under MGNREGA.

Verdict and way forward

• The claim is largely valid: India's development model is centralised in design and decentralised only in execution, and results suffer. But the fix is not devolving everything — it is matching each decision to the level that holds the information.
• Practise subsidiarity: activity mapping for each scheme, predictable untied funds and own-source revenue for local bodies, working State Finance Commissions, trained local staff, and social audits that feed back into design.

Development works best when a central vision is joined to local decision-making — subsidiarity must be practised in budgets and staffing, not merely proclaimed in constitutional text.

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The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) made panchayats and municipalities the constitutional third tier — the government closest to citizens, where participation, responsiveness and accountability are actually tested.

Role in good governance

• Participation: gram sabhas and ward committees let citizens set priorities and question spending; MGNREGA social audits are a working example.
• Delivery: water, sanitation, street lighting, local roads and support to primary health and schooling are best planned where needs are visible.
• Inclusion: reservation for women, SCs and STs has brought new groups into local leadership.
• Constraints: weak devolution of funds, functions and functionaries, low own revenue, parallel bodies of line departments, and state control over elections and dissolution.

Merger: pros

• Planned growth of peri-urban areas that are urban in fact but rural in law, with uniform standards for water, sewerage and waste.
• A wider tax base and economies of scale in infrastructure.

Merger: cons

• Loss of rural entitlements such as MGNREGA work, higher property taxes and user charges, and pressure on farmland and commons.
• Dilution of gram sabha democracy in larger wards, while municipal bodies are themselves under-funded.
• Middle path: District and Metropolitan Planning Committees (Articles 243ZD and 243ZE) and rurban clusters allow integrated planning without forced merger.

Merger should follow real urbanisation and residents' consent, not administrative convenience; integrated district planning can capture most of its gains without sacrificing local democracy.

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India is an 'indestructible Union of destructible States', and the last decade has reshaped how the two levels deal with each other — from GST and NITI Aayog to disputes over Governors, central agencies and fiscal space.

Recent changes

• Fiscal: the 101st Amendment (2016) pooled indirect taxes under a GST Council in which the Centre holds one-third of the votes; the 14th and 15th Finance Commissions raised the states' share of central taxes to 42% and then 41%.
• Fiscal friction: cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool have grown; GST compensation ended in 2022; conditions on state borrowing have tightened.
• Institutional: NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission (2015), ending discretionary plan grants and promoting 'cooperative and competitive federalism' through indices and rankings.
• Legislative and administrative: reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir into Union Territories (2019); amendments to the Delhi (GNCTD) law enlarging the Lieutenant Governor's role; BSF jurisdiction widened in border states (2021); centrally sponsored schemes with fixed state shares.
• Flashpoints: Governors sitting on state bills, states withdrawing general consent to the CBI, and disputes over central agencies and all-India service postings.

Measures to rebuild trust

• Revive the Inter-State Council (Article 263) with fixed annual meetings and a standing secretariat; use zonal councils for regional issues.
• Governors: appoint after consulting the Chief Minister and set a time limit for assent to bills, as the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions recommended.
• Fiscal: cap or share cesses and surcharges, make transfers predictable, provide compensation-type support in shocks, and give states more untied funds.
• Legislation: consult states before laws on Concurrent List subjects and respect state competence over police, land and local government.
• Institutions: a consensus-driven GST Council, a clear protocol for central agencies operating in states, and stronger local governments to deepen federalism below the state.

Federalism is strengthened less by constitutional text than by conventions of consultation; regular, institutional dialogue and fair fiscal sharing can turn a decade of friction into cooperative trust.

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The 74th Amendment (1992) gave municipalities constitutional status, but Article 243W only says a State legislature 'may' endow them with powers; most States have chosen to keep control.

Functional reluctance

• Of the 18 Twelfth Schedule functions, States transfer only some; water supply, transport and planning often stay with parastatals, development authorities and State departments.
• Metropolitan and District Planning Committees (Articles 243ZE, 243ZD) stay unformed or dormant in many States, so State agencies still plan cities.
• State-appointed commissioners overshadow short-tenure mayors; elections are delayed and councils superseded.

Financial reluctance

• Own revenue is thin: property tax is under-assessed and poorly collected, and user charges are rarely revised.
• The RBI's Report on Municipal Finances (2022) found municipal budgets much smaller than in peer countries, and revenues dominated by property tax and transfers from above, leaving little financial autonomy.
• State Finance Commissions (Article 243Y) are constituted late and their recommendations delayed or ignored.

Why, and what should change

• States fear losing patronage and control, doubt municipal capacity and face fiscal stress of their own; yet some States have devolved more, and thin municipal staffing is a real limit.
• Remedies: transfer functions with funds and staff, reform property tax, municipal bonds, empowered mayors, timely SFCs, and functioning planning committees.

Until States treat municipalities as a third tier of government rather than their agencies, the constitutional promise of urban self-government will stay on paper.

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Article 356 lets the President take over a State's government when its constitutional machinery fails. Used freely for decades to dismiss inconvenient State governments, it became a rare and contested measure after the mid-1990s because the law tightened and the politics changed.

Legal factors

• S. R. Bommai (1994): the Supreme Court made Proclamations subject to judicial review, required relevant material showing a real breakdown, and held that it could restore a dismissed government and Assembly.
• Floor test: Bommai ruled that a majority is tested on the floor of the House, not by the Governor's opinion, closing the commonest route to dismissal.
• Parliamentary control: a Proclamation lapses in two months unless both Houses approve (Article 356(3)); the 44th Amendment (1978) barred extension beyond one year unless an Emergency is in force and the Election Commission certifies that elections cannot be held.
• Later enforcement: Rameshwar Prasad (2006) held the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly unconstitutional; the Court restored the Arunachal Pradesh government in 2016 (Nabam Rebia), showing that misuse can be reversed.

Political factors

• Coalition era: from 1989 governments at the Centre depended on regional allies whose State governments could not be dismissed without breaking the coalition.
• Rise of regional parties: strong State-based parties raised the political cost of imposing President's Rule and made federal bargaining routine.
• Advisory and public pressure: the Sarkaria Commission urged use only as a last resort after warning the State; media and public criticism of partisan dismissals grew.
• Alternative tools: Governors' reports are now scrutinised, and floor tests and court-monitored processes replaced summary dismissals.

Combined effect

• Legal limits raised the cost and reversibility of misuse; politics reduced the incentive. Since 2014 single-party majorities have returned at the Centre, yet use of Article 356 has stayed low, which shows the legal check holds even when the political one weakens.
• It has not disappeared: contested impositions in 2016 (Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh) were struck down or reversed by courts.

Judicial scrutiny and coalition politics together turned Article 356 from a routine political weapon into an exceptional remedy, as the Constitution intended.

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The 101st Amendment (2016) created the Goods and Services Tax, launched on 1 July 2017, replacing a maze of Union and State indirect taxes with one tax on supply. It is the biggest reform of India's indirect taxes and, unusually, one in which both tiers surrendered taxing power to a shared design.

Significance

• One market: subsumed excise, service tax, VAT, entry tax and others, ending cascading of tax on tax, cutting inter-State barriers and widening the base through input credit.
• New provisions: Article 246A gives Parliament and State legislatures concurrent power to tax goods and services; Article 269A assigns inter-State supplies to the Union with proceeds shared; Article 279A creates the GST Council.
• Compensation: States were guaranteed compensation for revenue loss for five years, easing their consent.

Accommodative federalism: the case for

• Shared forum: the Council brings the Union and every State to one table, with the Union holding one-third and the States two-thirds of the weighted votes and decisions needing three-fourths, so neither side can decide alone.
• Practice of consensus: most decisions have been by consensus rather than vote, and States have shaped rates, thresholds and exemptions.
• Accommodation of State interests: alcohol for human consumption stays outside GST; petroleum products come under GST only from a date the Council recommends (Article 279A(5)).
• Judicial reading: in Mohit Minerals (2022) the Supreme Court held that Council recommendations are not binding on Parliament and legislatures, describing the Council as a forum of cooperative federalism.

The limits

• States gave up independent rate-setting; the Union's one-third weight is an effective veto, while States must combine to block anything.
• The 2020 dispute over the compensation shortfall and back-to-back borrowing, delays in the dispute-settlement mechanism under Article 279A(11), and revenue dependence expose the imbalance.

Verdict

• The design is cooperative to a large extent; the spirit depends on the Union's conduct, timely compensation and a working dispute mechanism.

GST is a landmark experiment in pooled sovereignty; its federal credentials will be judged by whether consensus, not voting weight, continues to drive the Council.

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The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) gave panchayats and municipalities constitutional status, regular elections and a list of functions. In my view they have changed who governs at the grassroots substantially, but what those bodies control only partly.

What has changed

• Institutions: over 2.5 lakh panchayats and thousands of urban local bodies hold regular elections under State Election Commissions, and the gram sabha gives villagers a forum.
• Inclusion: reservation for SCs, STs and at least one-third of seats for women has brought millions of first-time leaders into public life.
• Delivery and planning: panchayats run MGNREGA, sanitation and water works, prepare Gram Panchayat Development Plans and hold social audits; PESA extends self-rule to Scheduled Areas.

Where the change stops short

• Functions, funds, functionaries: Article 243G leaves devolution to State law, so it is uneven; own revenue is low, State Finance Commissions are weak and line departments keep control of staff and schemes.
• Distortions: proxy rule by relatives of women members, elite capture and bureaucratic overreach dilute empowerment.
• Urban gap: municipalities lack control over water, planning and policing, and parastatal agencies sideline elected councils.

Completing the change

• Activity mapping of functions, assured Finance Commission grants, capacity building, e-governance and empowered gram sabhas.

Decentralisation has changed who participates and what gets delivered; genuine self-government at the grassroots still awaits a real transfer of powers, money and staff.

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The statement captures a real pattern in Indian federalism, but party positions on Centre–State relations have shifted with a party's place in power, at the Centre or in the States, more than with any fixed ideology.

National parties and centralisation

• Parties ruling the Centre have tended to strengthen it: Article 356 was used freely against opposition-ruled States before S. R. Bommai (1994) subjected it to judicial review, and centrally sponsored schemes and cesses enlarge the Centre's role.
• After single-party majorities returned in 2014, disputes over GST, the farm laws, NEET and the conduct of Governors revived the charge of centralisation.

Regional parties and State autonomy

• The Rajamannar Committee (set up by Tamil Nadu in 1969, reported 1971), the Akali Dal's Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973) and the October 1983 Srinagar conclave of opposition parties all demanded a shift of powers towards the States.
• In the coalition era (1989–2014) regional parties gained bargaining power, and federalism deepened through consultation and the Inter-State Council.

The exceptions

• National parties in opposition defend autonomy: the West Bengal Left Front's December 1977 memorandum on Centre–State relations, prepared by the CPI(M), is a national party's autonomy charter, and each major national party has questioned central overreach when out of power.
• Regional parties centralise within their States: many run their governments top-down, starve panchayats and municipalities of powers, and back the Centre when it suits them.
• Institutions cut across parties: the Sarkaria (set up 1983, reported 1988) and Punchhi (2007–10) Commissions, the Inter-State Council and the GST Council are where both camps bargain.

Verdict

• The alignment is real but circumstantial: positions follow power and electoral interest, so both camps change sides with the situation.

Healthy federalism cannot depend on which party rules the Centre; it needs institutionalised negotiation and fiscal devolution that bind all parties alike.

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The 14th Finance Commission, chaired by Y. V. Reddy, shifted resources towards the States for 2015-20, chiefly by enlarging untied tax devolution in place of discretionary, scheme-tied transfers.

How the States gained

• Devolution: the States' share of the divisible pool rose from 32 to 42 per cent, the largest jump ever, and the Union accepted it, giving States far more untied money.
• Predictability: horizontal shares followed a formula of population, area, forest cover and income distance, so transfers became rule-based and plannable.
• Revenue-deficit grants: about Rs 1.95 lakh crore over five years to 11 States with post-devolution gaps closed their revenue deficits.
• Local bodies and disasters: about Rs 2.87 lakh crore for panchayats and municipalities, and up to 10 per cent of SDRF for State-specific local disasters.
• Discipline with room: a 3 per cent of GSDP fiscal-deficit ceiling, with limited extra borrowing for prudent States, encouraged consolidation while rewarding performance.

Limits of the gain

• The Centre restructured centrally sponsored schemes and raised the States' share of their cost, and cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool grew, so the net gain was smaller than the headline 42 per cent.

The award widened States' fiscal freedom and predictability, but scheme restructuring and cesses meant that lasting fiscal health still depends on the States' own revenue effort and expenditure quality.

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Police and public order are State subjects, while the CBI is a central agency created under the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946; State consent is where State autonomy meets national investigation.

Why States question CBI jurisdiction

• Statutory basis: Section 5 lets the Centre extend the CBI's powers to a State, but Section 6 makes that extension operative only with the State's consent, general or case-specific.
• Constitutional scheme: Entry 80 of the Union List bars the police of one State from acting in another without the consent of that State's Government, the same principle that governs the CBI.
• Political distrust: fearing selective targeting, several States withdrew general consent, beginning with West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh in 2018, so the CBI must now seek case-by-case consent there.

Why withholding consent is not absolute

• Court-directed probes: in State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) a Constitution Bench held that High Courts and the Supreme Court may order a CBI investigation without State consent, sparingly and in exceptional cases.
• Limits of Section 6: consent is not needed in Union Territories and railway areas, and withdrawal cannot become a shield for corruption or serious crime that crosses State lines.
• National agency route: the NIA Act, 2008 lets a central agency investigate scheduled offences across the country without State consent, showing that federalism accommodates central investigation of grave crimes.

Federal balance

• Federalism is part of the basic structure, so consent protects the States' police power; equally, cooperative federalism expects States not to obstruct probes into inter-State crime, and the Centre not to use the CBI selectively.

Way forward

• A dedicated CBI statute securing its autonomy, objective criteria for taking up cases, reasons recorded for granting or refusing consent, and dialogue through the Inter-State Council.

State consent guards the federal character of policing, yet constitutional courts can order CBI probes when justice demands; the durable answer is a CBI independent enough for States to trust it.

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Indian federalism works through all three: forums for cooperation, rankings and fiscal formulas that spur competition, and disputes over money, agencies and turf that bring confrontation.

Cooperation: the norm

• Institutions: the Inter-State Council (Article 263), Zonal Councils, NITI Aayog's Governing Council and the GST Council (Article 279A), where the Centre holds one-third of the weighted vote and the States two-thirds.
• Fiscal: 42% devolution of the divisible pool on the 14th Finance Commission's advice.
• Crisis: the COVID-19 response from March 2020 ran through State administrations and Prime Minister–Chief Ministers meetings.

Competition: the newer face

• States compete for investment and are ranked on NITI Aayog's indices; the 15th Finance Commission's formula rewards demographic performance and tax effort.

Confrontation: the exception

• Money: the 2020 GST compensation shortfall, when the Centre offered borrowing options and several Opposition-ruled States objected.
• Agencies and law: Kerala's Article 131 suit against the CAA (2020) and Maharashtra's withdrawal of general consent to the CBI (2020).
• Farm Acts 2020: States objected that agriculture and markets are State subjects and some passed counter-bills (since then, the laws were repealed in 2021).

Cooperation and competition have built the working federation and confrontation has tested it, with courts guarding the balance (federalism is basic structure: S. R. Bommai, 1994); cooperation remains the norm and confrontation the exception, and trust-building forums with predictable fiscal rules keep the Union–State balance workable.

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Article 1 calls India a 'Union of States', and the framers gave the Union the upper hand so that a diverse country could hold together; the three laws named in the question show that tilt at work in 2020.

The centralising design

• Legislative: residuary powers with the Union (Article 248) and Union law prevailing on Concurrent subjects (Article 254).
• Executive: Article 256 lets the Union direct States to comply with parliamentary law, and the emergency provisions can make the federation unitary; Governors, All-India Services and single citizenship reinforce the centre.

Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897

• Public health is a State subject (List II) and the Act works through State regulations under Section 2; yet Entry 29 of the Concurrent List (inter-State spread of disease) and the 2020 amendment, which widened the Centre's power to inspect buses, trains, ships and aircraft and penalised violence against health workers, show the Union's reach.

Disaster Management Act, 2005

• A central law created the National Disaster Management Authority, chaired by the Prime Minister; in March 2020 it ordered a nationwide lockdown, and the Home Ministry's guidelines under the Act bound every State, which could add restrictions but not relax them.
• Section 72 gives the Act overriding effect over any other law, so the national framework prevailed over State choices.

Farm Acts, 2020

• Agriculture and markets are State subjects, yet Parliament legislated through Entry 33 of the Concurrent List (trade in foodstuffs), bypassing State market laws and the mandi system.

Federal checks that remain

• States answered: Punjab, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh passed counter-bills; the Supreme Court stayed the farm laws in January 2021, and Parliament repealed them in November 2021.
• Courts guard the balance: federalism is basic structure (S. R. Bommai, 1994); the GST Council and Chief Ministers' conferences temper dominance; lockdown enforcement, testing and hospitals ran on State machinery.

The Constitution deliberately tilts to the Union to protect unity, and 2020 showed why a single national response can matter; the same year showed that the tilt works only when exercised through consultation, leaving States real authority in their own fields.

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GST subsumed most of the states' own indirect taxes. To secure their consent, Section 18 of the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016 required Parliament to compensate states for revenue loss for five years, which the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 gave effect to.

Rationale for the Act

• Loss of autonomy: states surrendered much of their power to tax and feared losses, especially manufacturing states, since GST accrues to the state of consumption.
• Assurance: for five years from July 2017, each state's revenue is protected at 14% annual growth over its 2015-16 base; any shortfall is paid from a compensation cess on luxury and demerit goods credited to a dedicated fund.
• Trust: the guarantee was the price of cooperative federalism, letting states accept a common tax without fear.

COVID-19 and the fund

• Already strained: the 2019-20 slowdown left cess collections short of the 14% promise, and payments were delayed.
• Collapse: the 2020 lockdown crashed GST and cess receipts in 2020-21 while protected revenue kept growing at 14%, so the shortfall far exceeded the cess pool.

New federal tensions

• The Centre called the pandemic an 'Act of God', argued that it was not bound to fill a gap the cess could not cover, and offered states two borrowing options; states, led by opposition-ruled ones, replied that the guarantee was unconditional and that the Centre, which borrows cheaper, should borrow.
• Resolution: the Centre set up a special borrowing window in October 2020, borrowed Rs 1.10 lakh crore on behalf of the states and passed it on as back-to-back loans in lieu of cess releases.
• Deeper issues: states' loss of tax autonomy, the Centre's one-third vote weight in the GST Council (Article 279A), where decisions need a three-fourths majority, and a trust deficit over delayed dues.

GST compensation was the price of cooperative federalism; a lasting fix needs a predictable revenue guarantee, more buoyant state revenues and consensus in the Council rather than numbers.

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The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) made panchayats and municipalities a constitutional third tier, and the first two decades were spent asking whether States had devolved functions, functionaries and funds. With the architecture in place, the question has moved to functionality: do these bodies actually govern?

From the 3Fs to functionality

• Devolution was left to State legislatures (Articles 243G and 243W), so the transfer of Eleventh and Twelfth Schedule subjects is partial and uneven; functionality asks whether even the powers transferred are exercised.

Critical challenges

• Fiscal dependence: negligible own revenue, poor property-tax collection, tied grants and State Finance Commissions constituted late or ignored keep local bodies dependent on higher governments.
• Hollow devolution: line departments and parallel State agencies run schemes that belong to local bodies, and funds arrive scheme-tied, leaving no room for local priorities.
• Capacity: shortages of engineers, accountants and planners, weak training, and staff who answer to State departments rather than to elected councils.
• Planning without integration: District Planning Committees (Article 243ZD) seldom produce consolidated plans, so rural and urban schemes stay fragmented.
• Politics and society: proxy rule by 'sarpanch-patis' in seats reserved for women, elite capture, delayed elections, and the State's power to dissolve or supersede bodies.
• Urban stress: parastatals share functions with municipalities, mayors are weak, plans are outdated and borrowing capacity small, while cities grow fast.
• Accountability: gram sabhas and ward committees meet rarely, audits lag, and citizens see local bodies as agents, not governments.

Restoring functionality

• Activity mapping and untied funds; timely elections and Finance Commissions; empowered gram sabhas and ward committees; digital accounting; capacity building under the Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan; stronger mayors and municipal finance.

The third tier exists in law but not fully in practice; functionality will come only when States treat local bodies as governments in their own right, with real powers, predictable money and answerability to active citizens.

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The three lists of the Seventh Schedule cannot avoid overlap, so courts have evolved rules to decide which legislature may act: harmonious construction reconciles entries, and federal supremacy settles conflicts that cannot be reconciled.

Harmonious construction

• Entries of different lists are read together, each given the widest meaning consistent with the others, so that no entry becomes redundant.
• Pith and substance supports it: a law is placed in the list its true character belongs to, and incidental encroachment on another list is tolerated (State of Bombay v. Balsara, 1951).
• Because federalism is a basic feature (S.R. Bommai, 1994), courts try to preserve the State field before reaching for Union supremacy.

Federal supremacy

• Root: Article 246(1) gives Parliament exclusive power over List I ‘notwithstanding’ the powers in clauses (2) and (3), so the Union entry prevails where reconciliation fails.
• Concurrent List: a State law repugnant to a Union law is void to that extent under Article 254 unless it has the President's assent, and even then Parliament may override it.
• Colourable legislation, an indirect encroachment on another list, is struck down.

Balance in practice

• The Inter-State Council, Zonal Councils and the GST Council resolve overlapping claims before they reach the courts.

Courts read the lists harmoniously first and apply Union supremacy only as a last resort, a sequence that keeps India's federal balance workable while preserving national coherence.

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The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) reserved not less than one-third of seats in Panchayats and municipalities for women (Article 243D(3) for Panchayats), bringing lakhs of women into elected office; the question is whether presence has become power.

What reservation has changed

• Presence: women now hold office in every tier of local government, and some States have raised the quota to fifty per cent.
• Priorities: Chattopadhyay and Duflo found that women-led councils in West Bengal and Rajasthan invested more in drinking water, a need women rank highly.
• Capacity: training, self-help groups and Kerala's Kudumbashree have built women's confidence and public leadership.

Why patriarchy persists

• Proxy rule: the ‘sarpanch-pati’ practice, in which husbands or male relatives take decisions, reinforced by women's lower literacy, restricted mobility and household burdens.
• Rotation: Article 243D(3) allows reserved seats to rotate among constituencies, so women rarely build a durable base or contest an unreserved seat.
• Little to control: weak devolution of funds, functions and functionaries leaves Panchayats with few real decisions to take.
• No spill-over: women won 78 of the 542 seats filled in the 2019 Lok Sabha (about 14 per cent), and party organisations remain male-dominated.
• Social hierarchy: Dalit and tribal women leaders face caste-based harassment, and household duties limit participation.

Way forward

• Train elected women, penalise proxy rule, give reserved seats a longer tenure, devolve real powers, and implement legislative reservation (since then enacted as the 106th Amendment, 2023).

Reservation has widened women's presence and shifted local agendas, but the patriarchal character of politics changes only when quotas are joined to devolution, education, party reform and a shift in social norms.

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After 1991 India moved from command planning to indicative planning, and in 2015 NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission; in this market-oriented paradigm the State facilitates rather than directs, and planning is spread across Union, State, district and local tiers.

Multi-level planning

• National and State plans set the frame while district and local plans are built bottom-up: Articles 243G and 243W give Panchayats and municipalities a planning role, and Article 243ZD requires a District Planning Committee to consolidate their plans into a district plan.

Cost-effectiveness and fewer blockages

• Local knowledge matches schemes to real needs, avoids duplication among departments and directs money where impact is highest.
• Local ownership and gram sabha approval reduce resistance; convergence of MGNREGA, PMAY and other schemes through the Gram Panchayat Development Plan speeds delivery.
• District committees can coordinate line departments, so that clearances and works do not wait on distant approvals.
• Neo-liberal fit: as the State shifts from provision to facilitation, PPPs and regulation, local plans can draw in private, community and NGO partners.

Limits and risks

• Audits have found District Planning Committees slow to form or to produce plans in several States, so district plans are often wish-lists.
• Funds are tied to centrally sponsored schemes, leaving little untied money for local priorities, and technical capacity at district and village level is thin.
• Market-led planning can neglect social sectors and backward regions, and more tiers can add coordination costs and delay.

Way forward

• Devolve funds, functions and functionaries; set up professional planning cells at district level; integrate spatial and financial plans; monitor outcomes rather than outlays.

Multi-level planning delivers the efficiency the statement expects only when the lower tiers are genuinely empowered and equipped; otherwise it adds layers without removing blockages.

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Article 360 lets the President proclaim a Financial Emergency; it is the one emergency provision India has never invoked.

Circumstances for proclamation

• Ground: the President must be satisfied that the financial stability or credit of India, or of any part of its territory, is threatened.
• Judicial review: the 38th Amendment (1975) made the President's satisfaction final; the 44th Amendment (1978) deleted that clause, so a proclamation is justiciable.
• Approval and duration: it must be laid before both Houses and lapses after two months unless both approve; once approved it continues until revoked, with no outer limit.

Consequences while in force

• Union directions: the Union may direct any State to observe canons of financial propriety and give other directions the President thinks necessary.
• Money Bills: States may be required to reserve Money Bills and other financial Bills passed by their legislatures for the President's consideration.
• Salaries: the President may direct reduction of salaries and allowances of persons serving the Union, including Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and States may be told to do likewise.
• Federal and judicial cost: State fiscal autonomy is suspended in substance and judicial independence touched; even the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis was handled without it.

Article 360 is a reserve power for an extreme crisis; parliamentary approval and judicial review are its safeguards, and its drastic effect on State autonomy and judges' pay explains why it stays unused.

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On 4 July 2018 a five-judge Constitution Bench in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India read Article 239AA to hold that the Lt. Governor has no independent decision-making power and must ordinarily act on the aid and advice of Delhi's Council of Ministers.

What the judgment settled

• Status: Delhi is not a State but enjoys a special status; within the Assembly's legislative competence the elected government governs, and the Lt. Governor is bound by its aid and advice.
• Difference of opinion: the proviso to Article 239AA(4) lets the Lt. Governor refer a difference to the President, but only on matters of real importance, not as a routine veto; he cannot sit on decisions.
• Communication, not concurrence: the Council must inform the Lt. Governor of its decisions but need not obtain his prior approval.
• Constitutional morality: the Court invoked collective responsibility, cooperative federalism and mutual respect, warning both sides against obstruction.

Why it could not end the tussle

• Excluded subjects: police, public order and land stay outside the Assembly's power (Article 239AA(3)), and Parliament's overriding authority over Delhi continues, so friction is built into the design.
• Gaps left: control over 'services' and other specific matters went to smaller benches and stayed unresolved, so the dispute returned to the Court.
• Political rivalry: with different parties at the Centre and in Delhi, contests over transfers, postings and inquiries outlive any single judgment.
• Since then: in May 2023 a Constitution Bench held that the elected government controls services except public order, police and land; Parliament then created the National Capital Civil Service Authority by the 2023 Amendment Act, reopening the argument.

What is needed beyond the judgment

• Clear statutory allocation of powers, conventions of consultation, time-bound handling of references to the President, and restraint by both the Lt. Governor and the elected government.

The judgment clarified roles and gave primacy to the elected government in its sphere, but Delhi's unique status, excluded subjects and party rivalry mean disputes can return; cooperative federalism has to be practised, not merely declared.

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NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission on 1 January 2015. The Commission (1950) planned and allocated; NITI advises and coordinates, on principles meant for a federal, market-led economy.

Different principles

• Role: the Planning Commission drew up Five Year Plans and allocated plan funds to ministries and States, in effect steering State plans. NITI Aayog is a think-tank with no power over funds; its influence rests on evidence and persuasion.
• Direction of planning: the Commission planned from the top with one national template; NITI's principle is bottom-up planning, from village to State, with strategies tailored to each State.
• Federalism: States dealt with the Commission largely as claimants and were consulted through the National Development Council. NITI's Governing Council of Chief Ministers and Lieutenant Governors embodies cooperative federalism, its 'Team India' approach treats States as partners, and State rankings add competitive federalism.
• Economic philosophy: the Commission reflected a state-led, public-sector-centred model; NITI is market-friendly, engages the private sector and technology, and promotes innovation through the Atal Innovation Mission.
• Time horizon and monitoring: Five Year Plans (the twelfth ended in March 2017) gave way to a 15-year vision, a seven-year strategy and a three-year action agenda, judged by outcomes rather than outlays.
• Fiscal context: the 14th Finance Commission raised States' share of central taxes to 42 per cent, so untied money grew and a guiding rather than allocating body fitted the new balance.

Assessing the shift

• Gains: flexibility, knowledge inputs and a voice for States suit a mature and diverse economy better than uniform plans.
• Risks: without funds NITI lacks leverage, its advice can be ignored, and regional balance, once protected through allocation, is harder to secure.

The change moved planning from central direction to cooperative, evidence-based advice; it will succeed only if States get a real voice and NITI's counsel carries real weight in policy.

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Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand (2000) and Telangana (2014) are the recent cases of state formation; whether smaller states do better economically depends on far more than their size.

Economic case for new states

• Closer administration: smaller units shorten the distance between government and citizens, easing project monitoring and service delivery.
• Attention to neglected regions: hill and tribal areas that were peripheral in large states, Uttarakhand in Uttar Pradesh or Jharkhand in Bihar, gain their own budgets, capitals and policy focus.
• Tailored policy: a new government can court investment, build infrastructure and shape policy around local resources and needs.

Economic costs

• Duplication: a new capital, secretariat, assembly and institutions absorb funds that could have gone to development; Andhra Pradesh had to build a new capital after Telangana was carved out.
• Disputes: division of assets, liabilities, river water, power and staff drags on for years, as between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
• Fiscal dependence: small states with narrow tax bases lean on central transfers, special packages and special status, adding to the Union's burden.
• Instability and demands: smaller assemblies can be unstable, and each success invites fresh demands (Vidarbha, Gorkhaland) that strain inter-state cooperation.
• Mixed record: Jharkhand's mineral wealth has not translated into matching human development, showing that outcomes hinge on leadership, policy and institutions, not size; very large states, equally, can be unwieldy.

A reasoned view

• New states help the economy where administrative distance was real and resources are viable; they hurt where creation answers political pressure alone.
• The States Reorganisation Commission (1955) stressed unity and administrative, financial and economic viability; a standing framework should test these before any new state is created, with transition funding and asset-sharing rules fixed in advance.

New states are neither good nor bad for the economy in themselves; they pay off when objective criteria, fiscal planning and transition support accompany the political decision.

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The Finance Commission is a constitutional body under Article 280, appointed by the President every fifth year or earlier, to recommend how taxes and grants are shared between the Union and the States; it is the arbiter of India's fiscal federalism.

Constitution and functions

• Composition: a Chairman and four other members appointed by the President; Parliament prescribes qualifications by law, and under the 1951 Act these cover a High Court judge or one qualified to be, and persons with expertise in finance, government accounts, administration and economics.
• Duties (Article 280(3)): recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States and among the States; the principles governing grants-in-aid; measures to augment State funds to supplement Panchayats and Municipalities; and any matter referred in the interest of sound finance.
• Status: recommendations are advisory; the Union lays them before Parliament with an explanatory memorandum on the action taken (Article 281).

Terms of reference of the Fifteenth Finance Commission

• Constituted on 27 November 2017 under Chairman N.K. Singh, to recommend for five years from 1 April 2020.
• Core tasks: vertical and horizontal devolution, principles of grants-in-aid, and grants for local bodies and disaster management, after the Fourteenth Commission had raised the States' share of the divisible pool to 42 per cent.
• Population data (para 8): the Commission was required to use 2011 Census data, worrying States that had curbed population growth and feared losing share.
• Fiscal roadmap (para 5): a path for sound fiscal management for the Union and the States.
• Performance incentives (para 7): measurable, performance-based incentives in nine areas, which States read as conditionality on transfers.

The Commission is the constitutional arbiter of fiscal federalism; the recent terms of reference, with updated population data, fiscal discipline and performance incentives, will shape Centre–State finances and must be balanced against State needs.

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The 73rd Amendment (1992, in force from 1993) gave Panchayats constitutional status under Part IX as institutions of self-government to plan and deliver local development, backed by the 29 subjects of the Eleventh Schedule.

Importance as local government

• Democratic depth: regular elections, Gram Sabhas and reserved seats for women, SCs and STs bring a vast tier of representatives into public life and make government answerable at the doorstep.
• Development delivery: drinking water, sanitation, rural roads, MGNREGA works, schools and health services run through Panchayats, which now prepare Gram Panchayat Development Plans.
• Responsiveness: local knowledge fits schemes to needs, and social audits and Gram Sabha oversight check leakage.
• Constraints: Panchayats raise little own revenue and depend on grants; devolution of funds, functions and functionaries remains partial in many States.

Sources beyond government grants

• Own taxes and fees (Article 243H): with State authorisation, taxes, duties, tolls and fees such as house or property tax, market and fair fees, and charges for water and sanitation.
• Assigned and shared taxes: taxes the State collects and assigns to Panchayats, plus a share of State revenue devolved on the advice of the State Finance Commission, constituted every five years (Article 243I).
• Non-tax revenue: rent from Panchayat land, shops, ponds and community assets; user charges for services; income from common property resources.
• Other channels: projects funded by District Mineral Foundations in mining districts (2015 MMDR amendment), CSR contributions, community contributions and shramdaan, and institutional borrowing within State rules.
• Making it work: better property-tax administration, digital collection and accounts, and capacity building to widen the own-revenue base.

Panchayats are vital for local democracy and delivery; a wider own-revenue base alongside predictable transfers will make them financially self-reliant and truly accountable to the people they serve.

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The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) gave Panchayats and municipalities constitutional status, but Article 243G leaves each State to decide what powers they receive, so their record as instruments of governance is mixed.

What has worked

• Regular elections and reservation for women, SCs and STs have brought lakhs of new representatives into public office.
• Gram sabhas give citizens a nearby forum, and State Finance Commissions (Article 243I) review local finances every five years.

Where the statement holds

• Functions: the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules list 29 and 18 subjects, yet many States have devolved few; line departments and parallel agencies keep the real work.
• Funds: own revenue is thin, grants are tied, and SFCs are constituted late or their reports ignored.
• Functionaries: staff and technical skills are short; proxy control by relatives ('sarpanch-pati') and elite capture hollow out gram sabhas.
• Planning: District and Metropolitan Planning Committees often exist only on paper, and development authorities overshadow municipalities.

Views to improve the situation

• Activity mapping that fixes which tier does what, with staff transferred along with functions.
• Untied grants, wider property-tax and user-charge powers, and timely action on SFC reports.
• Capacity building, e-governance and social audit against capture and proxy rule.

Local bodies have widened participation but not yet delivered governance; the gap lies in devolution, not design, and closes only when States transfer functions, funds and functionaries together.

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The Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, in force from September 2016, gave the Union and the States a shared power to tax goods and services and enabled the GST rollout of 1 July 2017, replacing a maze of central and State levies with one destination-based tax.

Salient features

• Article 246A: concurrent power for Parliament and State legislatures to legislate on GST; Article 269A: GST on inter-State supply, levied and collected by the Union and apportioned between the two.
• Article 279A: a GST Council of the Union Finance Minister, the Minister of State in charge of Revenue or Finance and the State Ministers of Finance or Taxation; the Centre holds one-third of the weighted vote and the States two-thirds, and a decision needs three-fourths.
• Article 366(12A) defines GST, and the Amendment provides for compensation to States for revenue loss for up to five years.
• Subsumed taxes: central excise, service tax, State VAT, entry tax and others merge into GST, with input tax credit running across the whole chain.
• Exclusions: Article 279A(5) keeps petroleum crude, diesel, petrol, natural gas and aviation turbine fuel out until the Council recommends a date; alcohol for human consumption stays with the States.

Is it efficacious enough?

• Cascading: a seamless credit chain across goods, services and State borders removes the tax-on-tax that the old split between excise, VAT and service tax produced.
• Common market: one tax on one base ends entry taxes and check-posts, so goods move on a national rather than a State grid.
• Cooperative federalism: the Council is a standing forum in which neither side can decide alone.
• Limits: the fuel and alcohol exclusions leave a large slice of the economy outside the credit chain; multiple rate slabs in 2017 blurred the 'one tax' idea (since 22 September 2025 the main rates are 5 and 18 per cent, with 40 per cent for luxury and sin goods); compliance strained small firms and the technology platform in the first year; and States fear for their fiscal autonomy once compensation ends.

The Amendment is the right constitutional scaffold for a cascade-free common market; its efficacy is real but partial, and it grows as coverage widens, rates converge and compliance eases.

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The Constitution (Sixty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1991 inserted Articles 239AA and 239AB, giving Delhi a special status as the National Capital Territory, between a Union territory and a State.

Essentials of the Amendment

• An elected Assembly and a Council of Ministers under a Chief Minister, functioning from 1992, with the Lieutenant Governor as Administrator.
• The Assembly legislates on State and Concurrent List subjects except public order, police and land; Parliament's overriding power remains.
• Ministers aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor except in his discretion; differences go to the President, with urgent action allowed meanwhile.
• Article 239AB lets the President suspend the arrangement if constitutional machinery fails.

Anomalies behind the conflicts

• Discretion is undefined, so the Lieutenant Governor can treat almost any file as his own.
• The text does not settle control of services or the Anti-Corruption Branch, so both sides claim them.
• Police answer to the Union, yet voters hold the elected government responsible for law and order: responsibility without control.
• References to the President carry no time limit, so routine disagreements harden into stand-offs.
• (since then, Constitution Benches have held that the Lieutenant Governor is bound by ministerial advice on matters within the Assembly's powers (4 July 2018) and that services other than public order, police and land belong to the elected government (11 May 2023); the Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2023 then created a National Capital Civil Service Authority and was challenged in the Supreme Court.)

A new federal trend?

• Only in part: Delhi's design is unique, and Governors of States act on ministerial advice under Article 163.
• Yet friction will recur wherever a Centre-appointed head faces an elected government of a rival party, and it shows federal politics turning to courts for what convention once settled.

The conflicts flow from the unfinished design of Article 239AA rather than from a new model of federalism; clarity in the text and restraint on both sides will keep the capital governable.

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Article 370 was placed in Part XXI as a temporary and transitional provision, yet by 2016 it had governed the Union's relationship with Jammu and Kashmir for over six decades.

How temporary it was

• Text: Parliament's law-making power for the State was confined to Union and Concurrent List matters corresponding to the Instrument of Accession, in consultation with the State government, and to other matters only with its concurrence.
• Clause (3): the President could declare the article inoperative only on the State Constituent Assembly's recommendation; that Assembly dissolved in 1957 without recommending, which made the provision look permanent.
• Courts: in Sampat Prakash (1968) the Supreme Court held that Article 370 continued to operate even after the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist.
• Practice: Presidential Orders under clause (1)(d) extended most of the Constitution to the State, so the article became a channel of integration while its special content narrowed.
• Verdict: temporary in intent, durable in law and near-permanent in political fact.

Future prospects

• Continuity with erosion: the likeliest course was further Presidential Orders hollowing out the article while its shell stayed.
• Repeal: legally contested, since the body named in clause (3) no longer existed, and politically divisive; supporters saw a guarantee of autonomy, critics a barrier to integration, with Article 35A limiting non-residents' rights.
• Restored autonomy: demanded within the State, but hard to reconcile with a single constitutional order.
• (since then, Constitution Order 273 of 6 August 2019 made all clauses of Article 370 inoperative except one, which now applies the whole Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir; a Constitution Bench upheld this on 11 December 2023 in In re Article 370.)

Article 370 was temporary in design but durable in practice, and its future turned on political will rather than legal text; the 2019 change, now upheld, has moved the debate to restoring statehood and normal politics.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

The Government of India Act, 1935 proposed an All-India Federation of British provinces and princely states, but only its provincial part was ever brought into force.

Federal features

• A federation of provinces and princely states, the first legal scheme to bring both under one constitution.
• A three-fold division of powers through Federal, Provincial and Concurrent Lists, with residuary matters left to the Governor-General.
• A Federal Court (1937) to decide disputes between the Centre and the units and to interpret the Act.
• Provincial autonomy: from 1937 provinces had responsible ministries in their own sphere, an advance towards self-government within a federal frame.

Why it fell short

• Unitary reserve powers: the Governor-General and Governors kept special responsibilities, discretionary powers and emergency powers, so the Centre could override provinces at will.
• Undemocratic units: princely states' representatives were to be nominated by rulers, not elected, and the federation could start only after enough states acceded, which never happened.
• Incomplete Centre: federal dyarchy never came into force, so the Centre continued under the earlier arrangement.
• Colonial control: the British Parliament and the Secretary of State kept supremacy, so even the planned federation would have been a subordinate one.

Legacy

• The Constitution borrowed the three-list scheme, the Federal Court's role, the Governor's office and the emergency provisions, while deliberately building a stronger Union.

The Act laid down a federal framework on paper but not in spirit or practice; the Constituent Assembly adapted its federal ideas, with a stronger Centre, into the Constitution of India.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.

Effective government means institutions that deliver services, answer grievances and act transparently; people's participation means citizens shaping and monitoring that delivery. In India each feeds the other: institutions that listen invite participation, and participation makes institutions deliver.

Effectiveness enables participation

• Trust: when a Panchayat pays MGNREGA wages on time or a municipality clears a drain after a complaint, citizens see a return on engagement and turn up at Gram Sabhas and ward committees.
• Information and access: the RTI Act 2005, citizens' charters, proactive disclosure and online grievance portals give people the facts and the means to question officials.
• Enabling structures: the 73rd and 74th Amendments created Gram Sabhas, Panchayats and municipalities, but Article 243A leaves the Gram Sabha's powers to State law, so its vitality depends on how much each State devolves.

Participation improves effectiveness

• Local knowledge: villagers know which hamlet lacks water and which household is wrongly excluded; participatory planning under Kerala's People's Plan Campaign matched schemes to needs.
• Accountability: MGNREGA social audits and Jan Sunwais expose fake muster rolls and leakages, disciplining delivery from below.
• Ownership: decisions taken with people, on sanitation or school management, are sustained after the official leaves.

The circle can turn vicious

• Weak delivery breeds apathy; empty Gram Sabhas allow elite capture and corruption, which weakens delivery further.
• Constraints: low awareness and literacy, incomplete devolution of functions, funds and functionaries, and a hierarchical official culture keep participation formal rather than real.

Way forward

• Complete devolution to local bodies, give Gram Sabhas real powers over plans and beneficiary lists, ensure timely information, and build two-way digital feedback so that citizens' voice reaches decision-makers.

Responsive institutions and informed, engaged citizens reinforce each other; building that virtuous circle from the Gram Sabha upward is the surest route to effective and accountable governance in India.

Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.