‘Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker’! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India?
Approach · directive: “do you think / implications”
What it asks · Assess whether India should adopt the British convention under which the Speaker leaves party politics and is not opposed at elections, and how it would affect the Lok Sabha's business.
The question has 2 parts — answer each
- Do you think: whether India should adopt the British 'once a Speaker, always a Speaker' convention to make the office objective — a clear position with reasons
- Implications: what it would mean for the robust functioning of parliamentary business
Open with · In the UK the Speaker gives up party ties on election, is customarily not opposed by the main parties and is treated as above politics, a convention India has debated but not adopted.
Cover
- Case for: severing party ties would make key decisions more credible: money-bill certification, suspensions, Tenth Schedule disqualification and conduct of debate.
- Court signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court urged Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for Tenth Schedule disqualification instead of the Speaker.
- Indian context: the Speaker is elected by the House (Article 93), usually from the ruling side, and contests elections on a party ticket.
- Precedents: N. Sanjiva Reddy quit his party on becoming Speaker (1967), while Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his party in 2008 for refusing to resign.
- Difficulties: multi-party contests mean a Speaker cannot be returned unopposed by convention alone; without party backing, re-election is uncertain unless parties agree.
- Implications: more neutrality, fairer time for the Opposition and less disruption; but a Speaker who depends on the majority needs rules and all-party consensus.
- Middle path: resign party membership on election, fixed timelines for disqualification petitions, an independent tribunal, and live telecast of proceedings.
Close with · Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but disassociation from the party, time-bound decisions and an independent forum for disqualification would strengthen the Speaker's credibility.
Add value (verified)
- Article 94 already gives the Speaker continuity: on dissolution of the Lok Sabha the Speaker stays in office until immediately before the new House's first meeting. The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 94 (second proviso) — Legislative Department ↗“whenever the House of the People is dissolved, the Speaker shall not vacate his office until immediately before the first meeting of the House of the People after the dissolution”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2020, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 30 Sept 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer · 226 words (UPSC limit 150) · Minimalist IAS
In the UK the Speaker leaves the party on election, is customarily unopposed by the main parties at the next poll and is re-elected to the chair, so the office stands above politics; India has debated but not adopted this.
Case for adopting it
- Credibility: money-bill certification, admission of motions, suspensions and Tenth Schedule disqualifications are contested because the Speaker remains a party member.
- Judicial signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for defection cases instead of the Speaker.
- Precedent: N. Sanjiva Reddy left his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his in 2008 for refusing to resign.
Why full adoption is hard
- The Speaker is elected by the House (Article 93), usually from the ruling side, and fights elections on a party ticket; in multi-party contests no convention guarantees an unopposed return.
Implications for parliamentary business
- Positive: neutral rulings, fairer time for the Opposition, fewer disruptions, faster decisions on disqualification petitions.
- Risks: without an all-party bargain the office could weaken, and a Speaker cut off from the majority may struggle to carry the House.
Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but its spirit can be adopted now: leaving the party, time-bound disposal of disqualification petitions and an independent tribunal for defections would give the office the objectivity the British model achieves by custom.
Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.