‘Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker’! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India?
Approach · directive: “do you think / implications”
What it asks · Assess whether India should adopt the British convention under which the Speaker leaves party politics and is not opposed at elections, and how it would affect the Lok Sabha's business.
It asks 2 things — answer each
- Do you think: whether India should adopt the British 'once a Speaker, always a Speaker' convention to make the office objective — a clear position with reasons
- Implications: what it would mean for the robust functioning of parliamentary business
Open with · Article 93 lets the Lok Sabha choose its Speaker, usually from the ruling side and still a party member; in the UK the Speaker leaves the party and is customarily not opposed by the main parties.
Cover
- Indian context: the Speaker is chosen by the House (Article 93), usually from the ruling side, and contests elections on a party ticket.
- Stakes: the Speaker's decision is final on Money Bills (Article 110(3)) and on defection disqualification (Tenth Schedule, paragraph 6).
- Court signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court urged Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for Tenth Schedule disqualification.
- Precedents: N. Sanjiva Reddy quit his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his party in 2008 for refusing to resign.
- Implications: neutral rulings, fairer time for the Opposition, fewer disruptions; but multi-party contests mean no convention guarantees an unopposed return.
- Middle path: resign party membership on election, time-bound disposal of disqualification petitions and an independent tribunal.
Close with · Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but leaving the party, time-bound defection rulings and the tribunal the Supreme Court proposed would give the Chair objectivity.
Add value (verified)
- Article 94 already gives the Speaker continuity: on dissolution of the Lok Sabha the Speaker stays in office until immediately before the new House's first meeting.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 94 (second proviso) — Legislative Department ↗“whenever the House of the People is dissolved, the Speaker shall not vacate his office until immediately before the first meeting of the House of the People after the dissolution”
- Article 110(3): the Speaker's decision on whether a Bill is a Money Bill is final.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“If any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not, the decision of the Speaker of the House of the People thereon shall be final.”
- Tenth Schedule, paragraph 6: questions of disqualification on ground of defection go to the Speaker (or Chairman), whose decision is final.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“the question shall be referred for the decision of the Chairman or, as the case may be, the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final”
- Article 93: the Lok Sabha itself chooses two of its members as Speaker and Deputy Speaker.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2020, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer· 220words · Minimalist IAS
Article 93 lets the Lok Sabha choose its Speaker, usually from the ruling side and still a party member. In the UK the Speaker leaves the party and is customarily not opposed by the main parties, keeping the office above politics.
| Aspect | UK Speaker | Lok Sabha Speaker |
|---|---|---|
| Party ties | Given up | Usually retained |
| Next election | Main parties stand aside | Contests on party ticket |
Should India adopt it for objectivity?
- High stakes: the Speaker's decision is final on whether a Bill is a Money Bill (Article 110(3)) and on defection (Tenth Schedule, paragraph 6).
- Credibility gap: such rulings are disputed because the Speaker remains a party member.
- Court signal: in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider an independent tribunal for defection cases.
- Indian precedent: N. Sanjiva Reddy left his party on becoming Speaker (1967); Somnath Chatterjee was expelled by his in 2008 for refusing to resign.
Implications for robust parliamentary business
- Gains: neutral rulings, fairer time for the Opposition, fewer disruptions, faster disposal of disqualification petitions.
- Limits: in multi-party contests no convention guarantees an unopposed return; without an all-party pact the office could weaken.
Full adoption needs cross-party consensus, but its spirit can come now: leaving the party, time-bound defection rulings and the Court's proposed tribunal would give the Chair the objectivity Britain secures by custom.
Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.
