वर्तमान दल-बदल विरोधी व्यवस्था के अंतर्गत क्या लोकसभा अध्यक्ष का संवैधानिक पद दलगत राजनीति के कारण अतिसंवेदनशील हो गया है ? परीक्षण कीजिए । ध्रुवीकृत सदन के प्रबंधन में लोकसभा अध्यक्ष की निष्पक्षता को सुनिश्चित करने में किन संस्थागत परिवर्तनों की आवश्यकता है ?
Read this question in English
Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House ?
🧭 How to think about this question · directive: “examine / what”
Decode the demand
- Two directives: 'examine whether' asks for a tested verdict with evidence on both sides; 'what institutional changes' asks for named, workable reforms. Two headings, both compulsory.
- The issue in one line: a Speaker chosen by the majority party judges the defection cases that decide whether that majority survives.
- Three things to answer: why the office is structurally exposed, the evidence that it has actually bent, and reforms that fix incentives rather than blame individuals.
- The trap: writing a list of recent controversies. The examiner wants the constitutional design flaw, the judicial trail, a fair counterpoint and reforms that carry a committee or court's name.
Think in a structure
- Open with Articles 93 and the Tenth Schedule's paragraph 6 in one line, then pose the judge-and-player paradox.
- Vulnerability in dimensions: conflict of interest, delay, judicial correction, vacant deputy, counterpoint; one case or Article per point, drawn as a flowchart of how partisanship enters.
- Reforms as a table of proposal and proposer, then points that turn each into a concrete step for Parliament; end on the Court's unrealised 2020 call so the close is forward-looking.
Facts checked at source (4)· open
- Article 93: the House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof”
- Article 94(c): the Lok Sabha can remove its Speaker through a resolution backed by an absolute majority of its membership.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department ↗“may be removed from his office by a resolution of the House of the People passed by a majority of all the then members of the House”
- Keisham Meghachandra (2020): Parliament may consider replacing the Speaker as arbiter of Tenth Schedule disputes with a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge.Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (21 Jan 2020), [2020] 2 SCR - Supreme Court Reports ↗“Parliament may seriously consider amending the Constitution to substitute the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies as arbiter of disputes concerning disqualification which arise under the Tenth Schedule with a permanent Tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, or some other outside independent mechanism to ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially”
- The 2nd ARC's 4th Report (Ethics in Governance) recommended that defection disqualifications be decided by the President/Governor on the Election Commission's advice.2nd ARC, Fourth Report: Ethics in Governance (2007) - web.archive.org copy of the DARPG PDF ↗“2.1.3.2.4 Recommendation: a. The issue of disqualification of members on grounds of defection should be decided by the President/Governor on the advice of the Election Commission.”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2026, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Guidance: Minimalist IAS, checked 8 Nov 2026 (how we verify). ·
Model answer· 435words · Minimalist IAS
Article 93 asks the Lok Sabha to choose its Speaker and Deputy Speaker 'as soon as may be'; paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) makes that party-elected Speaker the judge of defection petitions. Whether a referee who is also a player can stay neutral is the question.
Has the office become vulnerable to partisan politics?
- Conflict of interest: the Speaker keeps party membership and is removable by a majority of all members (Article 94(c)), yet decides cases that settle that very majority.
- Delay as a weapon: paragraph 6 fixes no deadline, so petitions against ruling-side defectors can wait for years while those against the Opposition move fast.
- Keisham Meghachandra (2020): the Court asked Speakers to decide petitions within three months as the normal rule.
- Judicial correction as proof: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) made the Speaker a tribunal open to review; Subhash Desai (2023) had to demand decisions in reasonable time. Courts intervene only where neutrality failed.
- Framers foresaw self-interest: the Constitution already removes the Speaker from the chair when his own position is at stake.
- Vacant deputy: the Deputy Speaker's post stayed empty through the entire 17th Lok Sabha, removing the customary cross-bench balance.
- Counterpoint: many Speakers have ruled against their own side and the chair still commands respect; the flaw lies in incentives, not individuals.
- Majority elects Speaker
- Party membership retained
- Removable by majority (Art 94)
- Sole judge of defections (Para 6)
- Delay or haste decides survival
- Trust in the chair erodes
Institutional changes to ensure neutrality
| Reform | Proposed by |
|---|---|
| Permanent tribunal under a retired judge | Supreme Court, Meghachandra (2020) |
| President/Governor decides on Election Commission's advice | 2nd ARC, 4th Report (2007); Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) |
| Time-bound, reasoned rulings | Supreme Court, Meghachandra (2020) |
- Move adjudication out: amend paragraph 6 so an outside body decides disqualification; the Speaker keeps the House, not the verdict on the majority.
- Fix timelines in the Rules: a three-month limit with written reasons, enforceable on review, so delay stops being a tactic.
- Resign party membership: adopt the Westminster convention that the Speaker quits his party and major parties leave his seat uncontested.
- Opposition Deputy Speaker: fill the post in the first session, by convention from the Opposition, as Article 93's 'as soon as may be' intends.
- Raise the cost of punishing rulings: require a longer notice period and a special majority for removal, so a fair verdict does not cost the chair.
Parliament has yet to act on the Supreme Court's 2020 call for an 'outside independent mechanism' deciding disqualifications 'both swiftly and impartially'; doing so would restore the Speaker as trustee of both benches in a polarised House.
Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 8 Nov 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.
