GS Paper II 2020 · Q12
15 marks · 250 words Separation of powers & dispute redressal X-Ray · Core #15Judicial Legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities.
Approach · directive: “justify”
What it asks · Justify the surge of PILs seeking judicial guidelines for the executive despite separation of powers: explain India's functional separation, why courts issue guidelines in a vacuum, and the limits.
It asks 3 things — answer each
- Acknowledge the tension: judicial legislation versus the separation of powers as the Indian Constitution envisages it
- Justify the large number of PILs seeking guidelines for executive authorities — constitutional warrant, legislative vacuum, landmark examples
- Mark the limits: when guidelines become usurpation, and the balance courts should keep
Open with · India follows a functional, not rigid, separation of powers (Ram Jawaya Kapur, 1955), so binding court guidelines where no law exists invite the charge of judicial legislation.
Cover
- Doctrine: functional separation (Ram Jawaya Kapur, 1955) and Article 50; Aravali Golf Club (2007) warned that courts cannot run the government.
- Warrant: Article 32(2) directions, Article 141 binding law, Article 142 complete justice, and an expansive Article 21.
- Vacuum: Vishaka (1997) guidelines lasted until the POSH Act, 2013; D. K. Basu (1996) and Prakash Singh (2006) answered executive inaction.
- Practice: Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) recognised guidelines framed in the absence of legislation, but asked courts to discourage frivolous PILs.
- Limits: courts lack expertise, budgets and enforcement machinery; Article 142 cannot override express statutory provisions.
- Way forward: guidelines that lapse once Parliament legislates, hearings for all stakeholders, deference on resource-heavy policy, and timelines for the executive.
Close with · PILs seeking guidelines are justified as the alarm bell the Court described in Aravali Golf Club, provided courts treat them as a bridge to legislation, not a substitute for it.
Add value (verified)
- Article 32(2) itself gives the Supreme Court power to issue 'directions or orders or writs' to enforce fundamental rights, the textual basis for guidelines.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 32(2) — Legislative Department ↗“The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”
- Article 50 directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024) - Legislative Department, Article 50 ↗“50. Separation of judiciary from executive.—The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State.”
- Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (6 December 2007): courts cannot run the government and should act only as an alarm bell to make the executive perform its duties.Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, Supreme Court of India, 6 December 2007 - Indian Kanoon ↗“It needs to be remembered that courts cannot run the government. The judiciary should act only as an alarm bell; it should ensure that the executive has become alive to perform its duties.”
- Vishaka (1997) laid down guidelines for all workplaces under Article 32, to apply until legislation was enacted.Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, Supreme Court of India, 13 August 1997 - Indian Kanoon ↗“we lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all work places or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose.”
- State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) recorded that courts have formulated guidelines in the absence of legislation.State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, Supreme Court of India, 18 January 2010 - Indian Kanoon ↗“In suitable cases, the courts have also given guidelines and directions. The courts have monitored implementation of legislation and even formulated guidelines in absence of legislation.”
- The same judgment held that genuine PILs must be encouraged and frivolous ones discouraged.State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, Supreme Court of India, 18 January 2010 - Indian Kanoon ↗“We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged.”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2020, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer· 368words · Minimalist IAS
India follows a functional, not rigid, separation of powers: organs may overlap, but none may take over another's core function (Ram Jawaya Kapur, 1955). When courts frame binding guidelines where no law exists, critics call it judicial legislation; yet the many PILs seeking such guidelines have strong justification.
Judicial legislation versus separation of powers
- Constitutional design: Article 50 asks the State to separate the judiciary from the executive, and law-making belongs to elected legislatures.
- Judicial self-caution: in Aravali Golf Club (2007) the Supreme Court held that courts 'cannot run the government' and should act only as an 'alarm bell'.
Why petitions for guidelines are justified
- Textual warrant: Article 32(2) empowers the Court to issue 'directions or orders or writs'; Article 141 makes its law binding, and Article 142 allows orders for 'complete justice'.
- Legislative vacuum: Vishaka (1997) laid down workplace harassment norms 'until a legislation is enacted'; the POSH Act, 2013 later replaced them.
- Executive inaction: D. K. Basu (1996) set arrest and custody safeguards, and Prakash Singh (2006) ordered police reform that governments had long delayed.
- Access to justice: victims of harassment, custodial abuse or pollution rarely litigate alone; PIL lets citizens bring their cause.
- Recognised practice: in Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) the Court noted that courts have 'formulated guidelines in absence of legislation' to protect rights.
- Expansive Article 21: life and liberty cannot wait for legislative silence to end.
- Rights violated
- Law silent
- PIL under Article 32
- Interim guidelines
- Statute (POSH Act, 2013)
Limits that keep it legitimate
- Institutional limits: courts lack expertise, budgets and enforcement machinery; Article 142 cannot override express statutory provisions.
- Frivolous PILs: Chaufal held that genuine PILs 'must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged', and the Court imposes costs on frivolous petitions.
Way forward
- Sunset principle: guidelines should lapse once Parliament legislates, as Vishaka's did in 2013.
- Dialogue, not substitution: hear all stakeholders, defer on resource-heavy policy, and set timelines for the executive to act.
PILs seeking guidelines are justified as the 'alarm bell' the Court described in Aravali Golf Club: they wake a silent legislature and an idle executive. They stay legitimate only while courts treat them as a bridge to legislation, not a substitute for it.
Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.
