GS Paper II 2019 · Q20
15 marks · 250 words Other countries' policies & the diaspora X-Ray · Core #47‘What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s national self-esteem and ambitions.’ Explain with suitable examples.
Approach · directive: “explain”
What it asks · Explain, with concrete episodes, how differing US and Indian views of India's status and autonomy, together with trade, sanctions and regional disputes, create friction despite growing convergence.
It asks 3 things — answer each
- Explain the source of friction: Washington's failure to give India a place in its global strategy that matches India's self-esteem and ambitions
- Illustrate with suitable examples: status, strategic autonomy, trade, regional and multilateral differences
- Balance with the areas of convergence and suggest the way forward
Open with · In 2005 Washington set the goal of helping India become a major world power in the 21st century, and its 2017 National Security Strategy welcomed India's emergence as a leading global power; the friction lies in the gap between that rhetoric and the role on offer.
Cover
- Balancer, not equal: the 2017 US National Security Strategy places India within quadrilateral cooperation against China; Major Defence Partner (2016) and STA-1 (2018) are tools of that strategy.
- Strategic autonomy: CAATSA (2017) threat over the S-400, end of Iranian oil waivers in May 2019.
- Trade: GSP benefits withdrawn in June 2019; steel and aluminium tariffs (2018); disputes on data and e-commerce.
- Regional and multilateral: Taliban talks, Trump's Kashmir mediation offer (July 2019), WTO differences, US Paris exit announced in 2017.
- Convergence: nuclear deal (2008), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA and the first 2+2 (2018), the Quad.
- Way forward: treat India as a co-equal shaper of Indo-Pacific strategy, respect its autonomy, settle trade through a package, co-produce defence technology.
Close with · In 2010 a US President looked forward to a reformed Security Council with India as a permanent member; friction will ease when Washington turns such pledges into an equal place and accepts India's strategic autonomy.
Add value (verified)
- In 2005 the US State Department set the goal of a broader strategic relationship that would help India become a major world power in the 21st century.US Department of State: background briefing on India (March 2005) - web.archive.org copy ↗“Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”
- The 2017 US National Security Strategy welcomed India as a leading global power and linked it to quadrilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia.The White House: National Security Strategy of the United States (December 2017) - web.archive.org copy ↗“We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.”
- In his 2010 address to Parliament, President Obama backed India's permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council.The White House: Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament (8 November 2010) - web.archive.org copy ↗“I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2019, GS Paper II — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer· 293words · Minimalist IAS
In 2005 Washington said its goal was 'to help India become a major world power in the 21st century', and its 2017 National Security Strategy welcomed 'India's emergence as a leading global power'. The friction lies in the gap between this rhetoric and the role actually on offer.
Why Washington's strategy leaves India unsatisfied
- Balancer, not equal: the 2017 Strategy places India within quadrilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia, valuing it mainly as a counterweight to China.
- Instruments, not status: Major Defence Partner (2016) and STA-1 (2018) ease arms trade, but Delhi wants recognition as an autonomous pole.
Suitable examples of friction
| Issue | US action | India's interest |
|---|---|---|
| Russian S-400 | CAATSA (2017) sanctions threat | Strategic autonomy |
| Iranian oil | Waivers ended (May 2019) | Energy security |
| Trade | GSP withdrawn (June 2019) | Market access, policy space |
- Trade: the US also imposed steel and aluminium tariffs (2018) and presses India on data localisation and e-commerce rules.
- Regional: US talks with the Taliban sidelined India in Afghanistan; President Trump's offer to mediate on Kashmir (July 2019) clashed with India's bilateral stand.
- Multilateral: WTO differences on subsidies and public stockholding; the US announced its Paris Agreement exit in 2017 (it rejoined in 2021).
The convergence
- Strategic alignment: the civil nuclear deal (2008), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA and the first 2+2 dialogue (2018) and the Quad show deep Indo-Pacific convergence.
Way forward
- Co-equal role: treat India as a shaper of Indo-Pacific strategy, not a client.
- Respect autonomy: accept India's ties with Russia and Iran as sovereign choices.
- Trade package: settle GSP and tariffs together; co-produce defence technology.
In 2010 President Obama looked forward to a reformed Security Council 'that includes India as a permanent member'. Friction will ease when Washington turns such pledges into an equal place and accepts India's strategic autonomy.
Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.
