Vikas is a government officer with over a decade of service in public administration. He has recently moved as the District Collector (DC) of Nainipura, a remote hilly district bordering a forest. Due to Nainipura’s low levels of economic development, one of his major duties is to ensure proper functioning of the public distribution system (PDS) amongst the economically weaker sections (EWS).
During his on-site visits, Vikas was apprised of a typical administrative challenge in operating the PDS. To prevent leakages, all distributors were required to carry out real-time biometric identification of the beneficiaries, whose fingerprints were tallied with identity card records. This was creating problems as the operating system sometimes rejected fingerprint matching in the cases of growing children, manual labourers and senior citizens. The problem was further compounded in periods of low WiFi connectivity. The distributors, in such cases, resorted to personal discretion when they could identify the recipient.
Vikas had to address this problem on priority. Strictly adhering to government regulations would ensure fiscal probity but would greatly trouble the proposed beneficiary, i.e., EWS. It may even impinge on their fundamental right to life as per Article 21 of the Constitution. Conversely, leaving the resolution solely to the discretion of the distributors could lead to misuse and leakages.
(a) What are the options open to Vikas? How should he balance fiscal probity with empathy towards the designated beneficiaries? (b) Discuss the ethics of using technology as a gatekeeper for welfare schemes.
Approach · directive: “what / how / discuss”
What it asks · Lay out Vikas's options for fixing biometric exclusion in the PDS, balance fiscal probity with empathy, and assess technology as a gatekeeper to welfare.
The question has 3 parts — answer each
- (a) Set out the options open to Vikas
- (a) Explain how he should balance fiscal probity with empathy towards the beneficiaries
- (b) Discuss the ethics of using technology as a gatekeeper for welfare schemes
Open with · Leakage control must not become exclusion — the right to food under the National Food Security Act, 2013 and Article 21 cannot hinge on a fingerprint.
Cover
- Stakeholders: beneficiaries (children, labourers, elderly), ration dealers, district administration, the exchequer.
- Option 1 — strict biometric only: probity, but denial of rations and hunger; unethical.
- Option 2 — dealer discretion: relief, but leakage and misuse.
- Option 3 (recommended): biometric first, with UIDAI-listed fallbacks (family-based, iris or OTP authentication), offline mode, and an audited exception register.
- Support: DBT deleted 6.36 crore fake ration cards, yet fingerprint authentication failed for 6% (UIDAI, 2018); update biometrics, connectivity, grievance redress.
- (b) Technology as gatekeeper: removes ghost beneficiaries and adds transparency, but causes exclusion errors, digital divide, loss of dignity and privacy risks.
- (b) Ethics: technology should enable, not gatekeep — design for the most vulnerable, and let no eligible person be denied for a machine's failure.
Close with · Welfare technology is ethical when its errors fall on the system, not on the hungry.
Add value (verified)
- The Department of Food and Public Distribution has instructed all states and UTs that no genuine beneficiary be denied entitled foodgrains under NFSA for want of Aadhaar or for failure of biometric authentication due to network or technical reasons. Cancellation of ration card due to non-seeding with Aadhaar — PIB, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, 5 February 2021 ↗“shall not be denied from their entitled quota of foodgrains under NFSA, on the ground of not possessing an Aadhaar number, failure of biometric authentication due to network/ connectivity/ linking issues or any other technical reasons”
- The National Food Security Act, 2013 makes subsidised TPDS grain a legal entitlement for as much as three-quarters of rural and half of urban residents. National Food Security Act — NFSA portal, Department of Food and Public Distribution ↗“The Act legally entitles upto 75% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population to receive subsidized foodgrains under Targeted Public Distribution System.”
- DBT and governance reforms in the PDS (cumulative to March 2025): deletion of 6.36 crore duplicate and fake or non-existent ration cards, with estimated savings of Rs 3,12,977.81 crore. Estimated Benefits/Gains from DBT and Other Governance Reforms (up to March 2025) — DBT Mission, Government of India ↗“Department of Food and Public Distribution PDS 2,49,972.53 63,005.28 3,12,977.81 Deletion of 6.36 crore duplicate and fake/ non-existent Ration Cards.”
- UIDAI's figures recorded in the Aadhaar judgment (2018): fingerprint authentication failed for 6.00% and iris for 8.54% of unique IDs; agencies are obliged to provide exception handling. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (Aadhaar), Supreme Court judgment of 26 September 2018 — UIDAI's answers recorded in the judgment ↗“Authentication failure rate at national level is as below: Modality Unique UID Failed Unique ID Failed Percentage Participated IRIS 1,08,50,391 9,27,132 8.54% FINGER 61,63,63,346 3,69,62,619 6.00% It must be stated that authentication failures do not mean exclusion or denial from subsidies, benefits or services since the requesting entities are obliged under the law to provide for exception handling mechanisms.”
- UIDAI's exception methods (recorded in the Aadhaar judgment, 2018): family-based authentication for PDS, and alternate modalities such as iris or OTP. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (Aadhaar), Supreme Court judgment of 26 September 2018 — UIDAI's answers recorded in the judgment ↗“Possible methods to implement the exception process include: (i) Family Based Authentication: Family based applications such as PDS or Health applications may allow authentication by family members to allow resident to avail services. (ii) Alternate Modalities: Some applications may use different modalities for exception handling. Alternate modalities include: (a) Iris Authentication (b) OTP Authentication (if allowed by policy)”
- Gandhi's talisman: in doubt, recall the face of the poorest and most helpless person and ask whether the step contemplated will be of any use to him. 70. The Gandhi Talisman — This Was Bapu, mkgandhi.org (Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal and Gandhi Research Foundation) ↗“I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, try the following expedient: "Recall the face of the poorest and the most helpless man whom you may have seen and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him.”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2026, GS Paper IV — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 1 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer · 327 words (UPSC limit 250) · Minimalist IAS
Biometric checks were built to stop PDS leakage; in Nainipura they have begun stopping the hungry. The National Food Security Act, 2013 legally entitles up to 75% of rural people to subsidised grain, and the right to life under Article 21 cannot hinge on a readable fingerprint.
Stakeholders
- Beneficiaries, especially children, manual labourers and the elderly; ration dealers; the district administration; the exchequer and taxpayers.
(a) Options open to Vikas
| Option | Gain | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Strict biometric only | No leakage | Hungry turned away |
| Dealer discretion | Instant relief | Leakage, ghost cards return |
| Biometric first, audited fallbacks | Probity with inclusion | Needs close monitoring |
Balancing fiscal probity with empathy
- Probity is real: DBT reforms deleted 6.36 crore duplicate and fake ration cards up to March 2025; leakage is no myth.
- So is exclusion: UIDAI told the Supreme Court, as recorded in the 2018 Aadhaar judgment, that fingerprint authentication failed for 6% of Aadhaar holders who tried it, and that agencies must run exception processes.
- Lawful fallbacks: the options UIDAI itself listed, such as authentication by a family member for PDS, or by iris or OTP. The Department of Food and Public Distribution has directed that no genuine beneficiary be denied grain for failed authentication.
- Accountable exceptions: the dealer records the reason, the beneficiary or nominee signs, an SMS reaches the household, and exception rates per shop are audited monthly.
- Fix causes: biometric-update camps for children and workers, better connectivity, and grievance redress within days.
(b) Ethics of technology as a gatekeeper for welfare
- For: it removes ghost beneficiaries, creates audit trails and adds transparency.
- Against: exclusion errors fall on the weakest; the digital divide; the indignity of proving one is oneself; privacy risks.
- Principle: technology should enable delivery, not decide eligibility; exclusion must be measured as seriously as leakage. Gandhi's talisman, whether a step is "of any use" to the poorest, is the right design test.
Welfare technology is ethical only when its errors land on the system, not on the plate.
Written by Minimalist IAS from facts checked at source (how we verify) — a little fuller than exam length, so every part of the question is covered; in the hall, keep the structure and trim the detail. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.