Use of Internet and social media by non-state actors for subversive activities is a major security concern. How have these been misused in the recent past? Suggest effective guidelines to curb the above threat.
Approach · directive: “how / suggest”
What it asks · Describe how terrorists, insurgents and other non-state actors have misused the internet and social media, and suggest guidelines that reduce the threat without harming freedom of speech.
It asks 2 things — answer each
- How: the internet and social media have been misused by non-state actors in the recent past
- Suggest: effective guidelines to curb the threat without harming free speech
Open with · A paradox: the network that lets a village sell online also lets a handful of people reach millions anonymously for propaganda, recruitment and rumour; since speech may be curbed only on Article 19(2) grounds, guidelines must be lawful as well as effective.
Cover
- Misuse, radicalisation: propaganda videos, online recruitment and grooming of young people by terror groups such as ISIS, including through encrypted messaging apps.
- Misuse, rumours and hate: fake news and doctored videos that incite panic and communal violence, as in the 2012 exodus of northeast people from some cities.
- Misuse, mobilisation and crime: coordination of protests and violence, funding through crowdfunding and crypto assets, arms and drug trade on the dark web, and cyber attacks and hacking.
- Legal tools: the Information Technology Act, 2000, including blocking under section 69A with safeguards, monitoring and interception, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
- Guidelines, platforms: due diligence, quick takedown and grievance redressal by intermediaries, cooperation on user information, and transparency, as in the 2021 IT Rules.
- Guidelines, capacity: strong cyber units, CERT-In and a national cyber crime coordination centre, monitoring of extremist content and counter-narratives, and digital literacy.
- Safeguards: any restriction must be lawful, necessary and proportionate, since free speech can be restricted only on the grounds listed in Article 19(2).
Close with · Online security rests on institutions as much as takedowns; SDG 16.a asks States to strengthen national institutions to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime, and a trained I4C-police-platform chain under judicial oversight is India's version of it.
Add value (verified)
- Article 19(2) lists the only grounds on which free speech may be restricted, including security of the State and public order, so online controls must fall within them.The Constitution of India (as on 1 May 2024), Article 19(2) — Legislative Department ↗“the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”
- IT Rules, 2021 (PIB, 25 February 2021): significant social media intermediaries must appoint a resident Chief Compliance Officer and a 24x7 nodal contact for law enforcement.PIB: Government notifies Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 ↗“Appoint a Chief Compliance Officer who shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act and Rules. Such a person should be a resident in India. Appoint a Nodal Contact Person for 24x7 coordination with law enforcement agencies.”
- IT Rules, 2021: grievances acknowledged within 24 hours and resolved within 15 days.PIB: IT Rules 2021 notification, grievance redressal ↗“acknowledge the complaint within twenty four hours and resolve it within fifteen days from its receipt.”
- MHA: components of the I4C scheme, including the Threat Analytics Unit, the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal and the joint investigation platform.MHA: Details about Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) Scheme ↗“Components of the I4C Scheme 1 National Cybercrime Threat Analytics Unit (TAU) 2 National Cybercrime Reporting Portal ( www.cybercrime.gov.in ) 3 Platform for Joint Cybercrime Investigation Team 4 National Cybercrime Forensic Laboratory”
- Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020): an indefinite suspension of internet services is impermissible.Supreme Court, Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (10 January 2020), judgment text hosted on Indian Kanoon ↗“we are of the opinion that an order suspending the aforesaid services indefinitely is impermissible.”
- SDG 16.a wording for the conclusion.UN SDG 16 targets (sdgs.un.org) ↗“Target 16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime”
Question: UPSC's CS (Main) 2016, GS Paper III — paper ↗. Approach: Minimalist IAS, checked 3 Oct 2026 (how we verify) — UPSC publishes no model answers. ·
Model answer· 298words · Minimalist IAS
The network that lets a village sell online also lets a few people reach millions anonymously for propaganda, recruitment and rumour. Since speech may be curbed only on Article 19(2) grounds, guidelines must be lawful as well as effective.
How non-state actors misused the internet in the recent past
- Radicalisation: ISIS used videos, online magazines and encrypted apps to recruit, including a few Indian youth.
- Rumour and riot: doctored images and mass messages drove the 2012 exodus of north-eastern people from Bengaluru; a fake video fed the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots.
- Mobilisation: separatists used social media to organise stone-pelting in Kashmir in 2016.
- Crime and espionage: crowdfunding and virtual currencies for terror funds, dark-web arms and drugs, and honey-trapping of defence personnel.
Effective guidelines to curb the threat
- Law with safeguards: blocking under section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 within Shreya Singhal (2015), which struck down section 66A; UAPA against terror content.
- Platform accountability: due diligence and time-bound takedown; since then the IT Rules, 2021 require large platforms to appoint a resident Chief Compliance Officer and a 24x7 police contact and to resolve grievances within 15 days.
- Capacity: the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C): threat analytics unit, national reporting portal, joint investigation platform, forensic lab and training centre.
- Counter-narrative: credible official information in crises, community leaders, de-radicalisation.
- Awareness and cooperation: digital literacy; mutual legal assistance for evidence abroad.
- Proportionality: restrictions must be necessary and proportionate; Anuradha Bhasin (2020) held indefinite internet suspension impermissible, so shutdowns must be rare and reviewed.
- Detect: I4C portal
- Lawful order: section 69A, UAPA
- Platform takedown
- Counter-narrative
- Judicial review
Online security rests on institutions as much as takedowns; SDG 16.a asks States to strengthen national institutions to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime, and an I4C-police-platform chain under judicial oversight is India's version.
Prepared by Minimalist IAS to the answer standard of Shivam Singh (mentor, 7 years) · facts checked against official sources (how we verify) · updated 3 Oct 2026. UPSC publishes no model answers: compare your structure and coverage with this, then write your own.
